

CURRENT *History*

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

MAY 1964

BRITAIN AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

THE COMMONWEALTH: EVOLUTION OR DISSOLUTION?	
	Arthur C. Turner 257
BRITAIN'S ECONOMY LOOKS TO EUROPE	Ann D. Monroe 263
BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC ROLE	Allan S. Nanes 269
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE	Ross N. Berkes 275
POLITICS IN BRITAIN	Thomas P. Peardon 282
THE BRITISH ECONOMY	J. D. Froggatt 291
THE ROOTS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY	Samuel J. Hurwitz 296

REGULAR FEATURES

MAPS • <i>International Trade Groups</i>	267
<i>United Kingdom</i>	287
<i>Commonwealth of Nations</i>	288
<i>Cyprus</i>	306
BOOK REVIEWS	300
CURRENT DOCUMENTS • <i>Johnson-Home Communiqué</i>	304
<i>U. N. Resolution on Cyprus</i>	305
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	309

FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

CURRENT History

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY
The New York Times

PUBLISHED BY
Current History, Inc.

EDITOR, 1943-1955:
D. G. Redmond

MAY, 1964

VOLUME 46 NUMBER 273

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editors:
JOAN B. ANTELL
NEYSA S. HEBBARD

Promotion Consultant:
MARY A. MEEHAN

Contributing Editors

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

SIDNEY B. FAY

Harvard University, Emeritus

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Columbia University, Emeritus

HANS W. GATZKE

The Johns Hopkins University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Illinois

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN

City University of New York, Emeritus

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY

Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN

Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania

JOHN WUORINEN

Columbia University

Book Review Editor:

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

Coming Next Month

DISARMAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

Our June, 1964, issue will be the first of a three-issue set which CURRENT HISTORY plans to devote to a study-in-depth of disarmament and weapons control in the world today. This introductory issue will serve as an historical framework for CURRENT HISTORY's study of this most important theme.

Disarmament: An Historical Overview

by HANS KOHN, Professor Emeritus of History, City University of New York, and Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies, Wesleyan University;

The Wasted Decades: 1899-1939

by FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College;

The Role of the United Nations

by MARION H. MCINTYRE, United Nations Representative for the World Federalists, and Editor of the *Independent Observer*;

Disarmament Since World War II

by LLOYD JENSEN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois;

The Nuclear Test Ban

by RICHARD PRESTON, Argonne National Laboratory;

Weapons Control As Seen Abroad

by CARROLL QUIGLEY, Professor of History, Georgetown University.

Also Coming . . .

WEAPONS CONTROL TODAY, July, 1964

THE UNITED STATES AND WEAPONS CONTROL, August, 1964

HIGH SCHOOL DEBATERS: Note these 3 issues on the 1964-65 N.U.E.A. DEBATE TOPIC.

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, 156 Wolfpit Ave., Norwalk, Conn. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing office. Indexed in *The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright © 1964, by Current History, Inc.

85 cents a copy • \$7.75 a year • Canada \$8.00 a year • Foreign including the Philippines, \$8.50 a year
Please see inside back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

In this issue seven specialists evaluate Britain's strengths and weaknesses and her relations with the West today. What is Britain's position in the world? As our first author points out: "The basic fact about Britain is that the great decline in its own relative position is rendering it impotent to serve as the magnetic power center which can hold together a free association of nations. . . . Power begets power; weakness begets weakness."

The Commonwealth: Evolution or Dissolution?

BY ARTHUR C. TURNER

Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH is an unclassifiable entity whose nature is outside the normal categories of political taxonomy. It is clearly no longer an empire, and indeed had ceased to be an empire of any traditional kind long before the term "Empire" was generally replaced in usage by "Commonwealth," a term which, to be honest, does not come easily to the tongue and which won only slow and reluctant acceptance. Even though its member units are now sovereign states, the Common-

wealth does not constitute any kind of league or alliance, for it imposes no species of obligation on its members. The emphasis is on voluntary cooperation and extensive and continual consultation. It is therefore to be described most accurately in terms of an association or club.

Such a description almost automatically evokes another question, and a very proper question, whether such a seemingly nebulous entity is any longer of any real importance in the world's affairs, or whether its supposed "role" and significance on the world stage is merely another, if somewhat large-scale, illustration of the British talent for fantasy, akin to the widespread beliefs that cricket is the British national game; that the typical Englishman loves the countryside; or that British administration, and particularly the Intelligence departments, are outstandingly efficient.¹

¹ Britain is perhaps the most highly urbanized country in the world, and has been for over a century. Cricket attracts very small attendances, but football (soccer) enormous ones. British administration has been much less successful since 1945 in dealing with many major problems (e.g. transportation, fiscal policy) than the governments of the United States, France, or Western Germany, and has been disgraced by more *gaffes* in the fields of security and intelligence than any other major country.

This question is not an easy one to answer, and on it very different views have been expressed in recent years, ranging from the judgment (reported to be now fairly common in Washington) that the Commonwealth is essentially a phenomenon of the past with little present relevance or effectiveness, to the more optimistic view (naturally most often put forward by British publicists and statesmen) that the Commonwealth still exerts a subtle and benevolent, if somewhat intangible, influence, and that in the present phase of development of world affairs its influence may possibly be waxing rather than waning.

THE PRE-1914 COMMONWEALTH

To understand the present nature of the Commonwealth and the case to be made for either of these opposing views, some retrospective analysis of its course of development is essential. The same is true if one is attempting to assess how far there may be tensions and conflicts between Britain's Commonwealth relations and commitments and her ties to the Western alliance. The Commonwealth is not a static thing, not even an institution (like, say, the Constitution of the United States) which, though evolving, is changing at a slow rate and with a major element of stability and continuity from year to year and decade to decade. The Commonwealth is changing at breakneck speed. It can only be understood as a thing in process of becoming something else. Hence, if we are endeavoring to assess the direction and nature of its changes, we must consider, even if only in the barest outline, the ways in which it has been developing up to now.

At any time down to the late 1940's a sharp distinction was made between two different kinds of British imperial possessions. One was the overseas areas of white settlement which had progressed rapidly to the running of their own affairs internally. The other areas were areas with no large permanent white population. These latter possessions were not thought of as candidates for self-government; though concerning the greatest of them, India, some statements were made early in the nineteenth century which looked

forward to a day when India would be successfully trained in the arts of government and would again be independent.

The Commonwealth originated in the relationship of Britain with her "daughter-nations"—the areas of white settlement—and for approximately the first half-century of its existence it consisted solely of that group. These overseas Britains attained stable political form at different times. Canada, always regarded as the senior, was created in 1867 when the British North America Act established a common federal government for the colony of Canada (Quebec and Ontario), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The new Dominion of Canada was joined in the course of time by other areas of British settlement in North America. The final accession, that of Newfoundland in 1949, made Canada a federal system with ten provinces, instead of the nine that it had since 1905. Australia (officially known, rather confusingly, as the Commonwealth of Australia), was also a federation, created in 1900 out of six hitherto separate colonies. New Zealand, the least populous of these countries, had gained its political structure in the nineteenth century. The Union of South Africa came into being in 1910 with the union of the two old British colonies, the Cape and Natal, with the two Boer colonies, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, which had been defeated in the South African War (1899-1902).

The demographic character of these countries varied. New Zealand and Australia were almost wholly British in population. Canada's population, while nearly all European, contained a substantial minority (more than one-third) of French-Canadians. South Africa was the anomaly; only one-quarter of its population was European, and the British element formed a minority of 40 per cent within that minority.

It was at the Imperial Conference of 1907 (one of a series of conferences of the self-governing parts of the Empire held approximately every four years from 1887 to the Second World War) that it was decided to adopt the name "Dominion" as a generic name for what had been called "self-govern-

ing colonies." At the Imperial Conference of 1911, the five Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland were represented, plus the United Kingdom itself. The most important business of that conference was the attempt to devise unified measures to face the already present threat of war. In the years before 1914, the Empire had reached a crucial turning-point in its history: The great Dominions had long had complete control of their internal affairs, but diplomatically the Empire was still regarded, and functioned, as one. But the increasing importance and selfconsciousness of the Dominions was making it unavoidable that one of two alternatives would occur: either the common foreign policy of the Empire would have to be framed in a cooperative manner; or the diplomatic unity of the Empire would be replaced by a number of separate foreign policies—at which point, in substance, a Dominion would become a sovereign state.

BETWEEN THE WARS

The second development, of course, was what actually occurred. All the Dominions automatically went to war in 1914 when Britain did; their exertions in the war enhanced their national pride and, by something of a paradox, eroded imperial unity. Talk towards the end of the war of creating common political organs for Britain and the Dominions came to nothing. The trend was entirely the other way. The Dominions were separately represented at Versailles. In the 1920's, most of them pushed for more and more autonomy, though Australia and New Zealand were indifferent. The movement was led by the Irish Free State, created in 1922 and given Dominion status, although it

² A. B. Keith, *Letters on Imperial Relations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 34, 140.

³ *Report of the Inter-Imperial Committee, 1926* Imperial Conference. (The Committee's name contains a solecism: obviously it should have been *Intra-Imperial*.) Notice that in the definition *Empire* is used to mean the larger entity within which the Commonwealth is a special part. Later, especially in the 1950's, official usage came to substitute Commonwealth for Empire as the comprehensive name for all British territories whatever their status.

was not a country of the same kind, being in reality a mother-country, not a colony of settlement. The Irish remained discontented; they wanted a republic. A contemporary comment by Professor Arthur Berriedale Keith anticipated the attitude adopted, in regard to India, 27 years later. The Irish Republicans, he wrote in 1922,

have some right to ask: Why deny us a form which we value, when we are ready to concede all you really need as regards foreign policy and defense? Is not the Constitution of the British Commonwealth of Nations elastic enough to include a Republic? . . . Finally, it seems to be a confession of bankruptcy of British statesmanship to deny the possibility of a formal Republican Constitution within so strange an edifice as the British Commonwealth of Nations.²

The advice was not followed; in 1922 and for more than another quarter of a century "common allegiance to the Crown" was to seem the very hallmark of Commonwealth membership. It figures prominently in the famous definition (drafted by Lord Balfour) of the mutual relationship of Britain and the Dominions, adopted by the Imperial Conference of 1926:

They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.³

THE MULTI-RACIAL COMMONWEALTH

Restiveness at the relics of subordinate status was shown by Canada and South Africa as well as by Ireland. Canada was the first Dominion to embark on the creation of her own diplomatic system, sending a minister to Washington in 1927. The voicing of nationalist sentiments at the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930 led to the passing of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which attempted to bring the law into conformity with practice by repealing certain laws or portions of laws infringing Dominion autonomy. The present constitutional structure of the Commonwealth essentially rests on the Statute of Westminster.

Events in September, 1939, demonstrated

vividly, by contrast with 1914, that the diplomatic unity of the Commonwealth was at an end—though the forces of loyalty were great. Australia and New Zealand, as in 1914, regarded themselves automatically at war when Britain was; but the Canadian declaration of war came a week later, after a parliamentary vote; in South Africa there was not only a vote in a by no means unanimous parliament, but a change of prime minister. The Irish Free State (since 1937 called Eire) remained neutral, a decision which it followed logically by seceding altogether from the Commonwealth in 1949, becoming the Republic of Ireland.

When the decision was made in 1947 to give independence to the two new states of India and Pakistan, carved out of the former Indian Empire, the decision was made to treat them as Dominions, on the same basis as Canada and the rest. This was the climactic decision in the most recent phase of the development of the Commonwealth. It meant, though perhaps this was not fully foreseen at the time, in the long run creating a whole series of non-white units of the Commonwealth to be treated exactly *as if* their relationship to Britain were the same as that of the "Old Dominions"; though in fundamental matters of culture and kinship it was in reality quite different.

Stemming from the acceptance of India and Pakistan as Dominions when they became independent on August 15, 1947 (and their equally significant acceptance of that status) came the even more surprising mutual agreement two years later that India, even when it became a republic, as it had decided to do, would remain a member of the Commonwealth and would be accepted as such by the other members. And so, at this point, the

⁴ Text in Nicholas Mansergh, *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953) p. 846.

⁵ Speech of May 16, 1949.

⁶ Speech of June 3, 1947.

⁷ After 1947, this phrase gradually replaces "Dominion." It is not an exact equivalent, however, for the United Kingdom was not, strictly speaking, a Dominion, but is regarded as a "Member of the Commonwealth."

shibboleth of "common allegiance" was abandoned. A meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, in its final communiqué dated April 27, 1949, noted that "under the new constitution which is about to be adopted India shall become a sovereign independent republic" and went on:

The Government of India have however declared and affirmed India's desire to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of The King as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth.

The Governments of the other countries of the Commonwealth, the basis of whose membership of the Commonwealth is not hereby changed, accept and recognize India's continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this declaration.⁴

These two decisions set the pattern which has led to a great increase in the membership of the Commonwealth in recent years. Some states chose to leave the Commonwealth altogether (Burma, 1948; Ireland, 1949; the Sudan, 1956), but most have chosen to remain within it, with either monarchical or republican constitutions, after independence, presumably judging, in the words of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that the relationship has "a touch of healing" in it,⁵ or perceiving with his New Zealand colleague, Peter Fraser, that dominion status is not "an imperfect kind of independence. On the contrary it is independence with something added and not independence with something taken away."⁶

Ceylon became independent and a member of the Commonwealth very soon after India and Pakistan, on February 4, 1948; but a decade elapsed before the next series of members were created with the general winding-up of the European empires that was such a notable feature of the late 1950's and early 1960's. Ghana, the first Negro African state, became a member on March 6, 1957. There followed in rapid succession Malaya (August 31, 1957; enlarged into Malaysia, 1963), Nigeria (October 1, 1960), Cyprus (independent August 16, 1960; re-entered the Commonwealth March 13, 1961), Sierra

Leone (April 27, 1961), Tanganyika (December 9, 1961), Western Samoa (January 1, 1962);⁸ Jamaica (August 6, 1962), Trinidad and Tobago (August 31, 1962), Uganda (October 9, 1962), Zanzibar (December 10, 1963) and Kenya (December 12, 1963). Now the new additions overwhelmingly outnumber the "Old Dominions" plus Britain, a preponderance underlined by the virtual expulsion of South Africa from the association in the spring of 1961.

WEAKNESSES OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Statistically, the increase in membership is impressive, but it would be an error to regard it as an accurate index of increasing strength in the Commonwealth association or in the British position in the world. The basic fact about Britain is that the great decline in its own relative position is rendering it impotent to serve as the magnetic power center which can hold together a free association of nations and make them eager to follow its lead. Power begets power; weakness begets weakness. Contemporary Britain, with its lagging economy, can no longer provide the capital needed for economic development in the Commonwealth. Lacking (alone among the Western powers) a system of military conscription, its military resources are inadequate to defend the whole Commonwealth (as indeed they have been since at least the 1930's); they can even be stretched most embarrassingly by a series of minor calls for military exertion such as occurred simultaneously in January and February, 1964, in Cyprus, East Africa and Malaysia. This has nothing to do with the latest technology of weapons. There is a plain lack of fighting men on the ground and fighting ships on the seas.

Moreover, whereas the "Old," pre-1947, Commonwealth could be said with justice to be based fundamentally on a community of political ideas (for all its members had political systems more or less on the Westminster model), this claim fails in regard to several of the newer additions. In regard to a Ghana

—still more a Zanzibar—the claim is patently absurd. The alternative justification of the contemporary Commonwealth takes the opposite tack, and finds its justification in the reconciliation of diversities within its midst. But the tolerance of diversities turns out, in fact, to be oddly selective. The dictatorship of Nkrumah can be stomached without qualms, but the racial theories of the government of South Africa—which is, after all, still a functioning parliamentary system—apparently cannot.

One has also been told frequently that the life-blood of the Commonwealth is continuous consultation and that this exchange includes the circulation of a great deal of confidential information. But the extent to which this process has continued in the circumstances of the last few years is veiled in discretion. Is not the circulation of secret information, in fact, done on a selective basis? If this is *not* so; if India, a neutral, gets as much information from Whitehall as Pakistan, a Seato and Cento ally; if Ghana gets as much as does Britain's Nato ally Canada, then one is justified in concluding that there are practical grounds for apprehension. The much more probable alternative assumption, however, leads inevitably to the hypothesis that there may be evolving, despite all Britain's strenuous efforts to avoid it, an outer and an inner Commonwealth, the inner (which would indeed have a rationale and a cohesive force) being composed of the members that have most in common with Britain, and are linked with her in various alliance systems.

The outer Commonwealth, however, would still have a certain *raison d'être*, for it would continue to serve as a bridge and link between the developed economies of the world and the underdeveloped, mostly non-white, areas. In this regard, the Commonwealth steadily becomes more like a lesser United Nations, but one that, in virtue of its common past history of association with Britain, has a greater cohesive force, and a greater capacity for understanding than the United Nations.

The history of the past quarter-century has, in one sense, seen a reversal of 1776, for in effect Britain and the United States are

⁸ Western Samoa, however, continues for the present to have New Zealand conduct its foreign relations, and thus is not reckoned fully a Member.

again part of the same political system; but this time with Britain, not the United States, as the junior; or at least the lesser, partner. Since 1940, the defense of Canada has been linked with that of the United States; since 1951, so has the defense of Australia and New Zealand. In practical terms, these three "Old Dominions" now look to the United States first for their security, not to Britain. (It will be interesting to see, when Sukarno begins to want East New Guinea, held by Australia, as well as West New Guinea, whether Australia's reliance on United States support will prove well-founded or a broken reed.) Likewise, for Britain herself, security depends primarily on Nato—that is, on the United States.

Since the Commonwealth is no longer a defense-and-security system, there is no incompatibility between Britain's membership in various alliance systems—nearly all sponsored and supported by the United States—and her Commonwealth ties. In some cases, indeed, the two may strengthen each other, as for example Britain's Nato tie to Canada strengthens the Commonwealth tie.

In the economic sphere, however, it is a different matter, and there does appear to be some degree of incompatibility. There exists a Commonwealth system of preferential trade, the Ottawa system, created in 1932 and still of considerable, though diminishing importance. When faced by the problem of lagging economic expansion in the late 1950's Britain at length, and reluctantly, decided to turn economically to Europe. This was a deliberate decision to seek Britain's economic salvation, if necessary at the expense of the Commonwealth economic ties. The anguished noises which this caused in various Commonwealth countries would have been more worthy of respect had not these same countries been for decades accustomed to following the path of their own national interests even when it was directly contrary to that of Great Britain. Britain was, in fact, merely at long last taking a leaf out of their book; but, nevertheless, the surprise was great, the anguish real, and the damage to Commonwealth ties actual, if difficult to assess.

The British attempt to join E.E.C. was, of

course, frustrated, at least for the time, but even in the lesser arena of E.F.T.A. she continues to show a preference for European interests over her Commonwealth ties. It would seem that there has been some fundamental policy shift whose consequences will perhaps take decades to work out but which are already in part visible. British statesmen have in the past decade spoken of British policy as an attempt to reconcile the demands of her three areas of interest—the "special relationship" with the United States, based on common language and a considerable degree of common stock; the European set of interests; and the Commonwealth.

Between the first and the third there is no real incompatibility. But both of them are in some degree opposed to the European sphere, and in recent days Britain seems to be again feeling, as perhaps she has not felt since the Middle Ages, the pull of sheer physical contiguity. She has realized again that she is a European state, that she cannot escape to the oceans from the military realities of the European mainland; and that the great eco-

(Continued on page 307)

Arthur Campbell Turner, Chairman of the Department of Political Science in the University of California, Riverside, a native of Scotland but a United States citizen for many years, was educated at the universities of Glasgow, Oxford (Queen's College), and California (Berkeley). He has taught at Glasgow, Berkeley and Toronto, whence he moved to Riverside in 1953 as one of the founders of the Riverside campus of the University of California. He has played a leading role in the first decade of the campus's history, being responsible for the creation of both the Division of Social Sciences and the Graduate Division. As Professor of Political Science, his interests lie in the fields of International Law and Organization, and Comparative Government, especially the British Commonwealth. He has published a study of Nato, *Bulwark of the West* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1953) and is now writing a book about Britain and the Commonwealth, to be published by McGraw-Hill.

Although statements by both the Labour and Conservative parties clearly indicate that "Britain is not, within the near future, going to ask for E.E.C. membership," this writer emphasizes that, "whatever a Conservative or a Labour government would like to do, policy must be shaped to fit Britain into the world economy as it is becoming, not as it is now. Secondly, until a real alternative to the E.E.C. market can be found, economic relations with Europe must be in the forefront of British policy."

Britain's Economy Looks To Europe

By ANN D. MONROE

Manager, European Department of the Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd.

THE RECORD of British postwar economic relations with Western Europe is, after a flying start, a sad history of too little and too late. At the end of the war Britain's prestige in Europe was unmatched and its economy, though not unscathed by wartime strains and stresses, was far stronger than that of its continental neighbours. Until 1950, it played a leading role in the development of European institutions and the rehabilitation of the European economy. But it was at the same time preoccupied with problems and responsibilities elsewhere, which dominated British thinking about the country's future. Relations with Europe were envisaged as they had always been—subordinate to Britain's world-wide interests; and, if anything, this attitude was more pronounced in respect to economic relations than to political considerations.

So when the European countries proposed going beyond the limited form of cooperation

established in the late 1940's, Britain was unprepared. It turned down the suggestion that it should join E.C.S.C. (the European Coal and Steel Community), whose formation marked the opening of a new era in intra-European economic relations—a transition from cooperation to integration. Again, when the creation of the E.E.C. (European Economic Community)¹ was mooted, Britain held aloof. While the Six² went forward, Britain was left behind, and from this time lag it has never recovered. By 1957, it was sufficiently concerned to propose the creation of a Free Trade Area encompassing all the countries of Western Europe; but the terms on which such an organisation were envisaged fell far short of those already devised for the Common Market. If Britain had suggested its Free Trade Area even two years earlier, it might have been accepted by the continent; but, by 1957, it was too late. Again, in 1961, Britain requested membership in E.E.C. on special terms which it might well have secured two or three years earlier, but which by then were unacceptable to the Six. Britain was left with the cold comfort provided by E.F.T.A. (the European Free Trade Association)³ and the need still to find a workable policy.

It is a point of great significance that in these abortive negotiations Britain was at each stage being required not only to make a

¹ The treaty establishing the European Economic Community was signed on March 25, 1957, after a long period of debate and negotiations.

² Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy and Luxembourg constitute the "Inner Six" of the European Economic Community (Common Market).

³ A Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association was completed on November 20, 1959. Known as the "Outer Seven," this group comprised Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

larger commitment to Europe, but to see the problem of its relationship with the Six in a larger context. When it turned down an invitation to participate in the E.C.S.C. negotiations, it was considering only the relations of the British steel industry to its continental counterpart. The Free Trade Area negotiations embraced all industries; negotiations for E.E.C. membership took in agriculture as well. Similarly, in the Free Trade Area negotiations Britain, in effect, reserved a Commonwealth commitment (by excluding agriculture and stopping short of a customs union), whereas in the E.E.C. negotiations it threw into the melting pot its relations with the Commonwealth and with the rest of the world, more especially with the United States. It is no longer possible even to attempt to treat the question of Britain's economic relations with Europe, that is, essentially, with the E.E.C., in isolation. And on the Community's side, too, there has been a similar broadening of the issue: the E.E.C.'s relations with Britain can now only be seen in the context of its relationship to the world at large.

But this is to anticipate. Before contemplating the uncertain future, the past deserves closer attention; what has happened to Britain's trade over the past 15 years illuminates British objectives in seeking closer economic relations with Europe.

POST WAR POSITION

Once the war ended, the immediate need for Britain was to rebuild and more than rebuild its trade. A small island could not feed itself nor supply the materials for its industry; nor could it, as it had done before the war, finance a major part of its imports from the revenue from its accumulated overseas investments, for these investments had been sold to finance the war effort. The expansion of exports was the first priority of economic policy. It was inevitable that markets for these exports should be seen in terms of the Commonwealth and the United States. In the Commonwealth, Britain had captive markets: tariff preferences and the Sterling Area quota system (designed to conserve scarce currencies) working in its favour and,

possibly more important, trading partners who could afford to spend the reserves accumulated during the war on British goods. It had to sell to the United States in order to earn the indispensable dollars to buy what the United States alone at that time could provide. Europe as a market was a poor third: had it not been for Marshall Plan Aid and the O.E.E.C. trade liberalisation programme, the major European countries could barely have afforded to buy anything from Britain; as it was, they could not buy much.

This lopsided pattern of British trade expansion was reinforced by the movement of the terms of trade in favour of the primary-producing countries. The acute world shortage of food and raw materials bid up the export prices of most of Britain's major trading partners, who thus continued to be able to finance a huge volume of their traditional imports from Britain. In a seller's market Britain was not inclined to upset the pattern. Besides, it was widely believed that the post-war shift in the terms of trade as between exporters of industrial goods and primary-producing countries was here to stay. Had this belief been correct, Britain would not have spent the last five years worrying away at the problem of finding a viable relationship with Europe.

The first serious doubts were cast on the assumption that the terms of trade had permanently shifted in favour of the primary producers by the post-Korean slump, though it was possible to dismiss the collapse of commodity prices as a natural reaction to the Korean price inflation. Time, however, has shown that this was only the beginning. Commodity prices staged a brief recovery in 1956; thereafter, there was a steady decline which has only recently been reversed. Taking 1953 as 100, the unit value of exports from the primary-producing countries fell with only the one interruption to 88 in 1961. Prices of industrial exports meanwhile rose; a similar index for the unit value of exports from industrialised countries had reached 109 by 1961. This increase in the price of manufactured exports benefited Britain a great deal less than the fall in commodity prices

harmed it; for every one of its major Commonwealth markets became less able to afford to buy British goods.

Britain's difficulties were aggravated by its own failure in competitiveness, by the increasing protectionism of the underdeveloped countries themselves and, above all, by the weakness of its starting position in the most important markets of continental Western Europe. There imports were soaring and there it was being conclusively demonstrated that, at the present stage in world economic development, industrialised countries are each others' best markets. The weakness of Britain's position was underlined by its failure to evolve a satisfactory economic policy that would permit growth without inflation and without a foreign payments crisis, a failure that is summarised in the lamentably slow growth of GNP during the 1950's and early 1960's.

EUROPEAN MARKETS GLITTER

Within this generally gloomy picture, there was one bright spot. While Britain could not take full advantage of the boom conditions in Europe, more particularly within the Six, its sales there were nevertheless doing extremely well. In 1953, sales to the Six accounted for rather less than one-eighth of Britain's total sales. Between 1953 and 1957 (the date of the first major British approach to Europe), they grew by 45 per cent in value, against a rise of only 28 per cent in total exports. From 1957 to 1961, they grew by 33 per cent in value, against an increase of only 11 per cent in total exports; in 1962 and again in 1963, the trend steepened. British exports to the Six now account for more than one-fifth of its total exports.

Is it any wonder, then, that closer relations with the E.E.C. should be seen as a means of giving Britain's sluggish exports (they have grown much less rapidly than those of other European countries) a tremendous boost? This boost was the first need: on this the proposal for a Free Trade Area (a means of gaining for European outsiders the benefit of free trade on the E.E.C. pattern without its disadvantages and responsibilities) was based.

Other possibilities were seen to follow—greater scope for economies of scale, a sharing of the too heavy burdens of running Sterling as a world currency and contributing to the Commonwealth development effort, a general invigoration of the economy, not to mention the manifold political opportunities that would arise from coming to terms with the Six. As the prize of closer association continually receded, it became more glittering. But always in the calculations of businessmen and, one suspects, the Government, and in popular opinion, it was the trading opportunity that mattered.

In 1963, General Charles de Gaulle snatched the glittering prize away when Britain felt it had almost grasped it. The blow was all the harder because no viable alternative was offered. E.F.T.A., a jerry-built construction hastily put together to serve, it was said, as a bridge to E.E.C. entry, and undoubtedly as a negotiating pressure group, then rapidly had to be turned into an exemplar of how free trade, as opposed to the E.E.C.'s integration concept, works. As a bridge, E.F.T.A. was little short of disastrous, though it may in the end prove of some use as a pressure group in the forthcoming Gatt (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations; as an exemplar it is undoubtedly a success but one in which no one is seriously interested, for the very good reasons that it has no natural cohesion and is too small. It can never serve Britain as the huge, rich market that the E.E.C. might. It will come to its logical conclusion on January 1, 1967, when internal free trade in industrial goods between the member countries will be established.

E.F.T.A. is a side issue which may influence but cannot determine Britain's relations with Europe. What will determine them, assuming that Britain has some freedom of choice, is, first and foremost, the British view of the maximum advantage to be secured from alternative relationships with the Six, the United States and the Commonwealth. This is emphatically not a question that can be argued solely in economic terms; yet in the longer run, economic considerations may per-

force have the deciding voice in this issue.

TWO-PRONGED POLICY

For the time being, at least, Britain has a strong common interest not only with E.F.T.A. but with the United States, all outsiders so far as the E.E.C. is concerned, in seeking to persuade the Six to reduce their tariff barriers in order that the minimum diversion of trade shall be caused by the final introduction of the E.E.C.'s common external tariff. That is one prong, so to speak, of current British economic policy towards Europe, implying the fullest possible support for the forthcoming round of tariff negotiations under Gatt.⁴

The other prong is to pursue the closest possible relations with the Six by means of the regular meetings under the auspices of the Western European Union that were initiated in 1963. These are not negotiating or even fully consultative meetings, but they are a way for Britain and the Six to keep abreast of each other and discuss matters of mutual interest.

At present and for some years to come, there is no question of a new British application for membership in the E.E.C. The subject was raised early in 1964 in a House of Commons debate on the Commonwealth. Speaking for the Labour party, and quite probably for the next British government, Harold Wilson, the leader of the Opposition, pledged that Labour would not take Britain into the E.E.C. on any terms that would limit the country's freedom to trade with the Commonwealth. More temperately, the speaker for the Conservatives said that any future government would have to judge the question of entry into the E.E.C. in the light of the prevailing circumstances.

In practice, these statements add up to the same conclusion for current policy: Britain is not, within the near future, going to ask for E.E.C. membership. The Conservative government might even now be prepared to make a few more concessions than it had offered by the time the Brussels negotiations came to a halt, but it would not go further. For Gen-


eral de Gaulle, it seems it must be all or nothing. Therefore, it may safely be assumed that as long as the General remains in power, a Conservative government would not approach the E.E.C. Since de Gaulle will probably run for and secure reelection, that means for four or five years. Underlying these Conservative and Labour statements is a profoundly different approach to European questions. The Conservatives have left the door open for the more distant future; Wilson has, in effect, attempted to slam it shut. Whoever is in power in France, or indeed in other member countries of the E.E.C., a Britain which insisted on maintaining exclusive control of its trade relations with the Commonwealth could not be permitted to join the Six. Such independence of action over such a vital, and substantial, area of trade is entirely incompatible with the principles on which the E.E.C. is based. So Wilson's pledge was an oblique way of saying no to Europe; a Labour government under his leadership will not join the E.E.C.

LABOUR'S ALTERNATIVE

Wilson is not the whole of the Labour party and not all his followers would agree with him. He does, however, represent a strain of latter-day little Englandism that seems to be becoming increasingly powerful in the Labour party, and in some other quarters. This view sees Britain concentrating on turning itself into a "modern" nation, thanks to a huge educational, scientific and investment effort, able to stand alone—apart from any group. In Wilson's interpretation, the Commonwealth is included, but sketchily; he proposes regular Commonwealth meetings on capital investment programmes and a Buy Commonwealth policy in defence purchasing. This can hardly be said to add up to much, and the internationalist aspects of Wilson's policy—worldwide commodity agreements, support for the expansion of world liquidity, better administration of international aid—loom a good deal larger.

In practice, neither the Commonwealth nor international aspects of Wilson's policy are likely to have much influence if the essentials

⁴ Often referred to as the "Kennedy Round."



(From *The New York Times*, March 22, 1964. Used by Permission.)

of his proposals are carried to their logical conclusion. Rather, Britain will have to develop a Scandinavian-type economy, with high productivity achieved through ever greater specialisation and by jettisoning the responsibilities of worldwide interests. Wilson does not say how the transition from Britain's present, admittedly curious and outdated, role of a second-rate world power is to be achieved nor what will be its relations with Europe once the change is made; he may perhaps be forgiven since the Conservatives have equally neglected to explain how a multilateralist, free trade Britain competes with Europe, let alone the United States, in a multilateralist free trade world. But they did at least leave themselves with an option on the alternative solution of joining E.E.C. late, rather than never.

The fact is that, whatever a Conservative or a Labour government would like to do, policy must be shaped to fit Britain into the world economy as it is becoming, not as it is now. Secondly, until a real alternative to the E.E.C. market can be found, economic relations with Europe must be in the forefront of British policy. It is easily within the bounds of possibility that the world economy will become a very uncomfortable place for

Britain and that no viable alternative to Europe will be found. The shape of things to come should begin to be disclosed at the two major trade conferences to take place in Geneva later in 1964—the round of Gatt negotiations and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS

The Gatt negotiations were originally designed to secure a massive (50 per cent) across-the-board reduction in the duties which the industrialised nations levy on each others' exports of manufacturers. It is already clear that it will not do this, though it could lead to big changes, for the two most important parties to the negotiations—the United States and the E.E.C.—take a radically different view of what should be done. The United States insists that, at the same time that industrial tariffs are cut, the protection accorded to European agriculture under the E.E.C.'s common agricultural policy should be reduced. The Six are prepared to make only token reductions in agricultural protection. They have already had the gravest difficulty in agreeing to remove protection as among themselves; last year saw a prolonged crisis on this issue which was resolved only at the

eleventh hour by a good deal of horse-trading. In this sector, West Germany, normally liberal, is strongly protectionist in the interests of its own inefficient, high-cost farmers. The French, who see the German market as an outlet for the increasing surplus of their more efficient agriculture, have been pressing for measures which will, in accordance with the Common Market Treaty, give them easy access to the German market. In respect to imports from the rest of the world, however, the French are even more protectionist than the Germans. They would like to see an agriculturally self-sufficient Community largely fed by French farmers.

In order to secure French agreement to a serious effort towards reduction of industrial tariffs during the Gatt negotiations, the rest of the Six have had to agree to much of the French line on agriculture. But none of them is entirely happy about the outcome and, moreover, they are committed to a fairly rigid attitude in Gatt, for if they once abandon the line of approach so painfully agreed upon, the advance to agricultural integration might be compromised. So the positions of the United States and of the E.E.C. on agricultural protection could prove irreconcilable, and thus destroy any chance of success in these negotiations.

On the other hand, neither side would be willing to see the negotiations end in total failure, unless General de Gaulle should decide once again to act as executioner. So it is generally expected that some fairly sizable reductions, say 20 to 30 per cent, in most industrial tariffs will come out of the Gatt negotiations, linked to a face-saving compromise on agriculture which will provide for a further round of negotiations in a year or so. Thus, the 1964 Gatt negotiations could initiate a series of conferences which, by the early 1970's, would have resulted in a reduction of tariffs on industrial goods to very low levels, or even to their total abolition. Such an outcome would exactly suit Britain. It would give it access to the large tariff-free market it needs; it would give it, in fact, a much larger tariff-free market than was promised by membership in the E.E.C. In such circumstances

Britain could go it alone if it so desired; it might equally well decide to join the E.E.C. for political reasons since the objections to doing so—objections constituted by the protective, inward-looking features of the Community's character—would have been dissipated. In a free-trade world, the Community would be as liberal as Britain could desire.

DANGERS FOR AN "OUTSIDER"

In anything short of a free-trade world, the case for actively seeking once again to join E.E.C. would be much stronger. If the Gatt negotiations never get off the ground or if tariff-cutting sticks halfway, Britain would still be at a competitive disadvantage in the world's two largest import markets. Unless the terms of trade once again shift in favour of the underdeveloped countries as a result of a big increase in primary commodity prices, Britain could not find compensation for its position as an outsider by expanding markets elsewhere; and, if they did shift, Britain would still have a hard row to hoe in competition with the United States and the E.E.C. Here is where the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development is significant. It represents essentially an attempt by the underdeveloped countries to see that they gain a more advantageous position in world trade. Various measures have been suggested: tariff preferences in the developed countries, commodity agreements and regional trading organisations. There are here the germs of a grand series of protected regional markets on the scale of the E.E.C. itself. Protection in a small African country with an economy so narrow that it can only support a handful

(Continued on page 308.)

Ann D. Monroe has been associated for more than 10 years with the Economist Intelligence Unit where she has led several teams pursuing important studies on Britain's economic relations with Europe and with the Commonwealth. The Economist Intelligence Unit is a business research organization in London, a subsidiary of *The Economist* magazine.

This specialist traces Britain's role in West Europe and her strategic relationship to the United States, especially with regard to nuclear weapons development. "For many Englishmen, and not in the Tory party alone," he notes, "it is difficult to accept Britain's changed status." Nonetheless, as he points out, ". . . Britain can no longer play the role of the European balancer."

Britain's Strategic Role

By ALLAN S. NANES
*Foreign Policy Analyst,
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress*

BRITAIN'S STRATEGY toward Western Europe, as all students of history know, was traditionally governed by the view that no single power should be permitted to dominate the continent. Her separation from Europe by the Channel encouraged a kind of intellectual isolation, so that England was "of" Europe, but not "in" it. Dependent on trade not only for her livelihood but for her very survival, England developed a reliance on sea power that was unique in its time. During her heyday she was unchallenged mistress of the seas and intervened actively on the continent only to prevent its threatened domination. In such cases Britain threw her weight on the scales on the weaker side, thereby converting it to the stronger. Throughout the modern era England skillfully played her role as Europe's balancer.

But all this changed in the aftermath of World War II. Although England emerged from that conflict as a victorious power, she was also an exhausted one. Under these conditions she was forced to yield leadership to a vastly more powerful United States. Furthermore, as the cold war became a semi-permanent feature of the world scene, England's island position was changed from an asset to a liability. For her very compactness rendered her peculiarly vulnerable, first to the atomic and then the hydrogen bomb. The

advent of missiles compounded the difficulties to a point where Britain's defense seemed an almost insoluble problem. Thus Britain is primarily concerned with preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, but by the same token, her interests still call for the prevention of hostile domination of the continent.

If Britain is aware of her vulnerability, she is also aware of her past. For many Englishmen, and not in the Tory party alone, it is difficult to accept Britain's changed status. For people of this frame of mind it is easy to favor the idea of an independent British deterrent. Indeed it was a Labour government, resentful of a United States decision to monopolize through the McMahon Act a jointly developed weapon, which launched the separate British atomic weapons program. An underlying reason for this British move was the fear that Britain might be forced to fight in self-defense if the United States should prove unwilling to defend her. In addition, there was the feeling then, as there is now, that Britain might be committed to war by United States decision before the possibilities of negotiation had been exhausted, and for reasons not central to Britain's interests. Presumably a British nuclear capability might offer Britain the option of keeping out of such a conflict, while retaining the ability to protect her vital interests. Finally, with atomic

weapons the new hallmark of great power status even a Labour government was determined to have them.¹

These arguments, if advanced today, might well be characterized as Gaullist. Yet there are significant differences. In acquiring her own deterrent, Britain was not seeking to diminish United States influence in Europe. Nor was a British atomic force created because of opposition to United States strategic concepts, nor out of a desire to possess the ability to force United States nuclear retaliation. On occasion Britain might differ with specific United States policies, and she has repeatedly sought to play a mediating role between us and the Soviet Union.

But in general Britain did not challenge United States domination of the alliance. Rather she sought to attach herself closely to this country, on the basis of a "special relationship," growing out of the wartime alliance, a common language and a similar belief in democratic institutions. Similarly, in building up her nuclear arm, Britain did so without any overriding disposition to retrieve world leadership. In fact, it might be safe to characterize British policy in the early years of Nato as giving primacy to the American relationship over ties with Europe. As a result, Britain could proceed with her nuclear buildup with United States acquiescence, if not with our active support. Such assistance as the United States was able (or perhaps willing) to extend to British nuclear development covered fields of atomic energy production other than weapons.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Nevertheless, the British rapidly developed an atomic weapons capability. Their first atomic tests were conducted in the Monte Bello islands, off Australia, on October 3, 1952. Four years later, on October 11, 1956, the Royal Air Force tested Britain's first operational A-bomb, and on May 15, 1957,

¹ See F. S. Northedge, *British Foreign Policy*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) p. 173.

² Two preceding paragraphs rely for their data on Richard C. Peet, "SAC's Kissing Cousins," *Air Force*, January, 1964. Quoted in the *Congressional Record*, January 20, 1964, p. A182-A184.

a successful H-bomb test was conducted over Christmas Island in the Pacific.

Britain developed her delivery system, the so-called V-bombers, concurrently with her development of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The first of these was the Vickers Valiant, which entered service in 1955, before the British had actually perfected an atomic bomb. Then came the Vulcan, the world's first large bomber with a delta wing, and finally the Victor, whose B-2 model entered service only in 1962.²

These V-bombers have an average radius of action of over 1,500 nautical miles without any in-flight refueling. This means that they can reach 70 per cent of the more important targets in the U.S.S.R. Obviously, they constitute an important deterrent force, as long as they can avoid destruction in any hostile first strike. To prevent such a catastrophe, the V-bombers can be dispersed to more than 50 bases throughout Britain. In addition, R.A.F.'s Bomber Command would receive the same warning as S.A.C. from the elaborate B.M.E.W.S. (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) network and the D.E.W. (Distant Early Warning) line. This is an indication of the extent to which the strategy of S.A.C. and the Bomber Command are coordinated. It is assumed that an attack on either the United States or Britain would almost automatically mean an attack on the other.

But if Britain developed a nuclear deterrent, she could only afford to do so at the price of a decline in her conventional strength. This new policy was signalized in the famous Defense White Paper for 1957, which enunciated a British version of the American "new look" in defense. British troop strength in Europe was to be cut from 77,000 to 64,000, conscription would end in 1960, and Britain would develop her own intermediate range missile, the *Blue Streak*. While Britain's decision could not logically be protested by the United States, which at that time was following a similar policy, it did arouse concern for its seeming cavalier attitude towards the problem of Nato's conventional forces. In addition, it simply increased the desire of the French for their own nuclear force, and since

it implied that the non-nuclear members of Nato would have to furnish the ground troops, it revived, in some French quarters, the old suspicion that Britain would fight to the last Frenchman.³

If Britain decided to go in for missiles as a cheaper alternative to the manned bomber force, she was destined for a rude shock. The cost of the *Blue Streak* proved prohibitive and the missile itself simply duplicated American I.R.B.M.'s already stationed in Britain. The crash came in 1960, when the cancellation of the *Blue Streak* program was announced, to the accompaniment of stinging criticism of defense policy from the Labour opposition. The significance of this cancellation is neatly summarized by Alastair Buchan as follows:

The cancellation of the *Blue Streak* missile in 1960 and the consequent decision to rely on the American *Skybolt* air-launched missile, made the maintenance of the British nuclear deterrent increasingly dependent on American technology, emphasized the intimacy of the special Anglo-American relationship (no closer than Canada's but more intimate than that of any European country), and, in operational terms, made the use of R.A.F. Bomber Command virtually inseparable from that of Strategic Air Command.⁴

TURN TOWARD EUROPE

But while Britain was waiting for *Skybolt*, which would tie her ever more closely to the United States in a strategic sense, she was veering away from the priority she had always given the American and Commonwealth connections, and turning toward application for membership in the European Community. The significance of this, from a strategic point of view, lay in the British assumption that economic unity presaged political unity, which in turn would mean the elaboration of a common European defense policy.⁵ Thus while the British "independent" deterrent was becoming the captive of American technology,

³ See C. M. Woodhouse, *British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961) p. 88.

⁴ See Alastair Buchan, "The Choices for British Defense Policy," *International Journal*, Summer, 1963, p. 282.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ See News Release, Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, No. 980-62.

British policy began to imply a European role for British nuclear power.

Meanwhile, the United States was encouraging Britain's tentative approaches to the E.E.C., and when Britain finally took the plunge and applied for entry, the United States stood foursquare in her support. American writers and public men began to talk of an Atlantic Community, which was often likened to a dumbbell, bulging with an expanded European Community plus Britain on one side, the United States on the other, with the Atlantic serving as the connecting bar. President John F. Kennedy gave this concept of Atlantic partnership vivid currency in his "Declaration of Interdependence" speech of July 4, 1962.

But if the United States encouraged Europeans to think of some form of political unity which would go beyond Europe, our actions in the defense field indicated that for the present at least we would be loath to see any such unity presage a common defense policy. For American strategic thinking had abandoned the policy of massive retaliation and adopted the policy of the flexible response. Rather than respond to any Soviet intrusion with an all-out nuclear assault, which lacked credibility anyway, we would gear our response to the magnitude of the Soviet thrust. In this way conventional probing action, for example, might be met by a conventional defense, or perhaps by a conventional counter attack. The object was to enforce a pause before nuclear weapons, with their irrevocable consequences, were brought into play. But if the United States were to be able to walk this very tricky line, it had to enforce a policy not of nuclear sharing, but of tight central control. The American hand had to be on the nuclear trigger. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made plain the United States distaste for other national nuclear forces in his famous speech at Ann Arbor in June, 1962, when he spoke of them as "dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."⁶

Whether America was aware of the inconsistency of her policy, which encouraged the unity of Europe in the political field while

disapproving of the logical consequences of that unity in the defense field, is not for us to analyze at this point. Indeed it may well be that such disapproval was only for the short run, and that given the establishment of a viable European Political Community the United States would have withdrawn her objections to sharing control of Nato's nuclear strategy. What is germane is that American policy complicated Britain's position. For the logical French asserted that Britain could not truly claim to be primarily a European power while simultaneously claiming a special relationship in defense matters to a United States that would deny any significant nuclear role to Europe.⁷

THE NASSAU AGREEMENT

It was at this point that the United States made the decision to abandon *Skybolt*, a decision announced at the Nassau Conference of December 18-21, 1962. If British pride had been hurt by the abandonment of *Blue Streak*, at least that was a British decision. But *Skybolt* was a United States weapons system, contracted for by Britain, and now abandoned by the Americans. It made no difference that *Skybolt* had failed all but one of her trials, or that the United States had repeatedly warned Britain that her abandonment might be necessary. The announcement of *Skybolt's* abandonment was greeted by all quarters in Britain with a veritable avalanche of criticism of the United States, while the Labour party raked the government for its stupidity, pointing out that Labour had correctly predicted that *Skybolt* would never be delivered.⁸

In place of *Skybolt*, the United States offered to make *Polaris* missiles available to Britain on a continuing basis. Britain, in turn, would have to supply the nuclear warheads and the submarines to carry them. This was the deal that Macmillan accepted at Nassau, and which he defended on the grounds that *Polaris* was a proven system, to the development of which Britain had not

had to contribute, and which had a life of almost a generation. But from a strategic point of view the significance of Nassau lay less in the substitution of *Polaris* for *Skybolt* than in the mutual agreement that these British nuclear forces, together with American nuclear forces of equal strength, would be made available for inclusion in a multilateral Nato force, to be developed in close association with other Nato allies. However, Britain was given the option of employing this nuclear force independently when supreme national interests so required.

It has been suggested that by agreeing to go along with the Americans at Nassau Macmillan sealed the doom of the British bid for admission to E.E.C. The argument goes that at Rambouillet, a week previous to Nassau, French President Charles de Gaulle invited Britain to choose between an Atlantic orientation or a European orientation to her policy, implying that if Britain took the latter course France would cooperate in building up a joint nuclear force and in opening the door to the Common Market. Macmillan himself has denied this argument, indicating that he told de Gaulle if the United States abandoned *Skybolt* he would try to obtain an effective alternative.⁹ But whether the British decision at Nassau hardened French sentiment, the fact remains that the British did choose the American connection over the French, by the simple act of agreeing to cooperate with America in the building of a Nato nuclear force.

Moreover, the Nassau agreement highlighted once again the touchy question of Britain's nuclear independence. On the one hand it could be argued that, while Britain had agreed to put her *Polaris* force at Nato's disposal, she had secured the right to its independent use. Against this could be asserted that the agreement still left Britain in a dependent position, for the *Polaris* missiles were actually to be furnished by the United States. The Conservative government, anxious to restore its prestige, which had been badly damaged by the *Skybolt*-Nassau debacle, was naturally inclined to the former view. Labour asserted that as long as a vital com-

⁷ Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

⁸ See Laurence W. Martin, "Honest Brokers" in the Nuclear Muddle," *The Reporter*, January 2, 1964, p. 21.

⁹ Speech to Conservative party meeting at Liverpool, January 21, 1963.

ponent of the *Polaris* system had to be furnished by the United States, the independence of Britain's deterrent was so much fiction.

A POLITICAL ISSUE

This controversy now bids fair to become a leading issue in the forthcoming British elections. For the Government, which prior to Nassau had tended to soft pedal the independence of Britain's deterrent, has now served notice that it intends to retain ultimate control of both the V-bombers and the *Polaris* submarines, despite the commitment of these forces to Nato.¹⁰ How these two positions are to be reconciled is not explained. It would be expecting too much to have Britain stand idly by while the United States, the Soviet Union, and most of all France, maneuvered on the world scene from positions of nuclear independence. To show that it means business, the Government is pushing the development of a new airplane, the TSR-2, over which there has been as much controversy in Britain as the TFX evoked here, although for different reasons.

The government contends that the TSR-2 (tactical strike reconnaissance), which will be able to fly at more than twice the speed of sound at an altitude of 60,000 feet, or at mach 1 speed at low levels, can be used to attack strategic targets. Supposedly it can also fly at ground-hugging levels in total darkness, because of the highly sophisticated and efficient electronic equipment it carries.¹¹ The plane would fire a short-range nuclear guided missile carried internally. If the TSR fulfills the promise the government holds out for it, it could not only fill the gap for Britain until the *Polaris* submarines are put into service, but it could also supplement the *Polaris* force once the latter is operational. Indeed there is even talk that the TSR could form the backbone of a better Nato deterrent than the multilateral surface force at present advocated by the United States.

But the first TSR was scheduled to roll off

¹⁰ Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 20. Statement of the Prime Minister at opening of Parliament, November, 1963.

¹¹ Peet, *op. cit.*, p. A-183.

¹² See *New York Times*, February 5, 1964, p. 1.

the production line at the beginning of 1964, so it is not a current component of Britain's deterrent force. In the meantime the government has announced successful modification of the Victor and Vulcan bombers, and of the air-to-surface *Blue Steel* missile.¹² According to Hugh Fraser, British Secretary of State for Air, the V-bombers can now operate for long distances at treetop level, and the *Blue Steel*, the standoff missile which they will fire in lieu of *Skybolt*, may be fired from low levels. The significance of such modifications is that they would permit penetration of an enemy radar network. If these modifications are indeed successful it could mean two things: first, that the life of Britain's V-bomber force has been prolonged so that there will be no gap until the *Polaris* force is ready, and second, that Britain's range of options as well as her striking power have been greatly increased. Furthermore, the technological base would have been created for a more independent British policy within the alliance, assuming Britain would wish to pursue it.

But the Labour party, which may be Britain's next government, is not greatly impressed by this new evidence of Britain's independence. Not only have some of its leaders expressed scepticism of the claims made for the TSR-2, but the Party has also been opposed to prolonging the life of the V-bombers, on the grounds, which the Conservatives would now argue are invalid, that such bombers are ineffective against the latest air defense. Labour's doubts about the independent character of the *Polaris* force have already been mentioned. But well knowing that there is a good deal of old fashioned nationalism left in its rank and file, and that indeed to call for the outright termination of Britain's deterrent might be politically disastrous, Labour simply argues that the costs of maintaining the deterrent make it impractical for a country of limited resources.

The reverse of this coin is the championing of conventional forces, both to increase Britain's influence and to forestall any nuclear confrontation. This stance has paid political dividends with Washington, where Labour is more popular than it has been in some time.

On the other hand, this political credit may be quickly drawn down for several reasons should Labour succeed to power. In the first place, the Labour party is dead set against the multilateral force, which it does not regard as the solution to the problem of control of nuclear strategy. Secondly, Labour's anti-nuclear policy is seen as an instrument for stiffening the United States against giving nuclear weapons to Germany.

That in itself might raise no particular American objections, nor might its corollary, a demand that all other European nations renounce their nuclear ambitions in return for British renunciation.¹³ But this nuclear self-denial, as envisioned by Labour, is accompanied by a lingering affection for some program of European disengagement. Should a future Labour government attempt to implement such a policy it would find itself working at complete cross purposes from the United States. Yet it is possible that such an initiative would find a hospitable reception with some of the other Nato governments and with important segments of European opinion.

Thus Britain's strategic role in Western Europe promises to continue the mixture basically as before, but with a few new ingredients added. Since the end of World War II, Britain has been "bound to Western Europe as long as there was no firm balance against Russia without her; but neither this policy nor the maintenance of the British position in the world outside Europe was possible without a solid relationship with the United States."¹⁴ Both British parties have valued that solid relationship in the past, and both will continue to value it for the future. If the Tories are returned to power, they will presumably try to exert a more independent influence within the alliance, but in all likelihood the American connection will be given priority over that with Europe.

Conceivably this will continue to incur the wrath of Charles de Gaulle, and render difficult any British attempt to try again for entry

into the Common Market. But at present Britain seems content to lead the European Free Trade Association, and to enjoy through that medium close economic relations with other Nato members who are sceptical of the supranational Community. If Britain remains content with this arrangement, the opportunities for French leverage against her are consequently reduced. But the continued division of Western Europe into two economic blocs is not a salutary condition from a Nato point of view.

A Labour government could also try to maintain the primacy of the American connection, but under conditions which would give the entire alliance a major role over the planning of nuclear policy. Ironically, this would mean that Labour, which had opposed Britain's entry into E.E.C., was pursuing more of a European than a strictly national policy. Again, this particular solution to Nato's nuclear dilemma would not be welcomed by de Gaulle. Furthermore, if it were advanced too patently as a means to block nuclear weapons for Germany, it would embroil the British in a quarrel with the Germans, whether the United States decided to make such weapons available to the Germans or not, and whether the Germans wanted them or not. If a Labour government actively pushes for disengagement, it will be sure to earn German, as well as American, distrust.

Thus Britain can no longer play the role of the European balancer. But her influence is vital in the formulation of Nato policy. It is safe to assume that the maintenance and enhancement of that role will continue to be the object of British policy, whatever the political complexion of the next government.

Allan S. Nanes formerly taught at Hofstra College, Brooklyn College, Hunter College and American University. An authority on international relations, he served as a specialist in the United States State Department before joining the Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Congress. At present he is collaborating on a book on the European Community.

¹³ Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁴ Northedge, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

Discussing Britain's relationship to the United States, this writer points out: "If anything suggests itself, it would be a stronger North Atlantic community identification for Britain . . . an identification that will develop at the expense of both the 'special relationship' role with the United States and the European identification as a partner . . . in the drive toward European unity."

The Anglo-American Alliance

By Ross N. BERKES

*Director of the School of International Relations,
University of Southern California*

THERE REALLY is no Anglo-American alliance. No doubt there are more formal and informal links between the United States and Great Britain than between the United States and any other power, great or small, near or far, but all of this cannot be reduced to the severe restrictions of a formal, bilateral alliance. Some are inclined to borrow Lord Salisbury's definition of the (ex-British) Commonwealth: an association of peoples who "have a disposition to agree on everything that really matters." But such felicitous phrases are better left to the shallow preserve of toastmasters and their kind.

Possibly the best identification—and even it defies effective description—is offered nowadays masked with disclaimers: Britain enjoys a "special relationship" with the United States. Since no one knows just what that means, we have the discomforting posture of Britons focusing on it mainly in fear that it doesn't exist, and Americans primarily concerned over the consequences of the probability that it does. The dimension that clinches the "special relationship" status might well derive from the McMahon Act, in that Britain continues to enjoy the very exclusive status of a power legally permitted to know some of our atomic secrets, on a reciprocal basis.

Whatever has been built over the past 18 postwar years, it hardly began well. An heroic,

pro-American Churchill had been replaced by a Labour government headed by a nice, modest little man, one who—in words attributed to Churchill himself—"had a good deal to be modest about." Nearly everyone underrated Clement Attlee, and not least the Americans—large numbers of whom continued to insist with ideological cheek that the word "British" should be used mainly to modify the ugly noun, "imperialism," whoever or whatever was in power in Britain.

Nearly all of our images of Great Britain in the first two years of the postwar period, and theirs of us, were distasteful. The emergent Labour leadership bore the stamp of the Leftist intellectual, Harold Laski, who by then was enough of a political liability to attract most of Churchill's well-publicized, if tactical, animosity. Churchillian hostility was a bit of political by-play that disguised the fact—particularly to the uneasy Americans—that Attlee had quietly but firmly ousted Laski from Labour's structure of power. It was hard to explain to Americans in mid-1946 that not only was the chairman of that year's annual conference of the Labour party no longer a Party spokesman, but that even what he said there was unrepresentative. The press naturally featured Chairman Laski on opening day, and it found space for his anti-American outbursts and such quotable quotes as: "Let capitalist governments mistrust one

another; that distrust is inherent in capitalist society. But governments like the Russian, and our own, are the surest hope of peace."

Let us dwell on these earlier images a bit longer, for they may be somewhat educational if and when Labour returns to power in Britain. In 1945-1946, Britain's new leadership was deeply Socialist. Spawned in the intellectual environment of the historic Left Book Club, educated by such works as John Strachey's doctrinaire, stirring, but singularly unprophetic 1936 book, *The Coming Struggle for Power*, these people were prodded and abused, spanked and memorialized once a week by Kingsley Martin's left-wing magazine, the *New Statesman and Nation*. They were also ridden by the haunting memory that the last and only other time they had tasted power, nearly a generation before, they had been cast aside and abandoned by their leader, Ramsay MacDonald.

These people had a highly doctrinaire approach to foreign policy, one whose greatest and most persistent warning was directed against the capitalist United States. It was not so much that the United States personified something they hated; more, we represented something to fear: a giant, swashbuckling economy that could drag them all into servitude and drown them in the boom-or-bust cycle of free enterprise.

As if something were needed to warn Labour against the United States, the very first crisis to hit the Attlee government after it took over power was the sudden, inexplicably unilateral cancellation of Lend-Lease by the equally inexperienced President Truman in August, 1945. The effect on Britain found even Churchill reduced to despair and incredulity. "I cannot believe," he told the Commons in a shocked voice, "this is the last word of the United States . . ." It wasn't. But it was surely a mighty poor beginning.

RESPONSE TO THE U.S.S.R.

Something else happened in the first post-war years of association that seems in the perspective of time to be both ironic and meaningful. If the cold war may be said to

have begun with the emergence of a Western challenge to the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union, then the Western response was originally more British than American. The hero was Labour's colorful Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, whose world had been trade unions, not foreign affairs. Blunt, spontaneous, short-tempered, even vulgar, Bevin in the words of a colleague was "The British Workingman, writ large . . . the same as everyone else only more so."

It was Bevin, not the American secretaries of state, who roared at the Molotovs and the Vishinskys for their effrontery in posing—before him, of all people—as members and champions of the proletariat. Tact and patience, moreover, were not part of his equipment. The Soviet leaders were spoilers and dissemblers, and constantly the victims of Ernie Bevin's towering, tongue-lashing indignation.

On top of Bevin's vigilant sensitivity to the menace of international communism came Churchill's historic speech from Fulton, Missouri, and its unexpected call for an Anglo-American response to the same menace. For Tory and Labourite leaders to share the same hostility toward and suspicions of the Soviet Union in mid-1946 mainly served to stir American misgivings of Britain, rather than to direct our alarm against Russia. As *The Economist* of London reported—in overtones of discouragement—on America's reaction to Churchill's Fulton speech:

... the vast bulk of opinion has crystallized, quite definitely, into one simple reaction. Americans do not want to be tied to a military alliance with Britain; they have no desire to defend the British Empire nor British colonial policy, and they are not yet convinced—tho their faith is badly shaken—that the last chance has gone of Big Three Cooperation within the framework of Uno.¹

It may be useful to note that the Socialist ideologues of the *New Statesman and Nation* were as appalled over Bevin and Churchill as was the American public, if for different reasons. Reacting to the Fulton speech with its by-then characteristic logic, "Staggers and Naggers" went on to thunder:

Acceptance of the division of the world into

¹ See *The Economist*, March 16, 1946, p. 415.

Capitalist and Communist halves would mean that Britain, both from financial and military reasons, would be a satellite of the United States. We should have to give up our independent development toward Socialism, and impotently follow America in the inevitable slumps and booms to which her unrestricted capitalism condemns her. . . . In effect, Britain would become the 49th State.²

By the middle of 1948, Anglo-American relations were hardly much smoother. British burdens in Palestine, by then overwhelming, reached a crisis precipitated by what most of Britain felt was American dabbling in the interests of domestic politics. Inclined toward the pro-Arab side of the problem anyhow, British opinion—both inside and outside of the Foreign Office—resented what were considered cheap tricks by President Truman in securing important Jewish votes in the Eastern seaboard states. Even the Marshall Plan, that “most unsordid act,” brought little to improve the atmosphere of Anglo-American relations. The state of British public opinion, as disclosed by a survey taken in mid-1948, found the pro-American *Economist* unwilling to characterize it as anything short of “shocking.” All of this was reflected in the following account:

Though a large majority thought it (the Marshall Plan) a good thing, 65% of the working class and 42% of the middle class, imputed to America not the wish to set Europe on her feet again, not even a defensive desire to stem the Communist advance, but the aggressive intention of buying allies for future wars, forcing its way into European markets, and imposing capitalism on other countries.³

By the middle of 1950, the main formulas of Anglo-American cooperation in the post-war era began to emerge under the heading of the Atlantic Alliance. However unappreciated, the Marshall Plan had turned the corner of Britain's economic recovery. For the first year since the war, the British would not have to scramble and grub for precious American dollars in order to live. On behalf of all the British people, the Labour government of Clement Attlee solemnly turned down

the Schuman Plan, and by rejecting this invitation to join the emergent West European coal and steel community, Britain opted out of the early drive toward European unity.

The emergent British coolness, not to say hostility, toward Western European unity developed in part, at least, as a function of her struggle against being regarded—and regarding herself—as merely a European power. Churchill's image of Britain's peculiar position in world affairs—at the intersecting point of three great circles, the Commonwealth, North America and Europe—was shared by the Labour regime. Yet the sense of independence that was engendered tended to militate against too close an association with Europe and for a more vigorous role in connection with the other two.

In terms of particular emphasis, Britain had opted in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty association, and not least among those who chose to champion this connection was the left-wing group of the Labour party led by Aneurin Bevan. For people whose memory of Bevan and his followers conjures up an image of volatile anti-Americanism, it must appear puzzling that *Tribune*, the Bevanite weekly, outstripped even *The Times* and *The Economist* in its advocacy of the Atlantic Alliance. Michael Foot, the *Tribune*'s articulate co-editor (the silent one was Bevan's wife, Jennie Lee; well . . . fairly silent), was and still is a Labour Member of Parliament whose socialism was sterner if less doctrinaire than that of the *New Statesman* crowd. Among his editorials of the day on the subject, the following selection is fairly typical:

The Atlantic Pact opens a new chapter in the postwar alignment of forces. Even before it was finally drafted, it had already ousted the Marshall Plan as the most conspicuous symptom of international division. The chances are that if Russia and her satellites had not refused to cooperate in the European Recovery Program, the Atlantic Pact would not now come into existence. Without a shadow of a doubt, its principal architects sit in the Kremlin.⁴

Between Clement Attlee and his government, Ernest Bevin and his trade unions, and Aneurin Bevan and his left-Socialist coterie, British Labour slipped easily and smoothly

² See *New Statesman and Nation*, March 9, 1946, p. 167.

³ See *The Economist*, April 17, 1948, p. 630.

⁴ See *Tribune*, March 18, 1949, p. 3.

into the role of Atlantic partnership. More doctrinaire British Socialists flocked in alarm to the standard of the *New Statesman and Nation*, only to find themselves even more outmanned than outspoken. The *New Statesman and Nation* agreed about not joining Europe, if mainly on doctrinal grounds, observing that the obstacles to entering Europe had "grown larger as the result of the divergence between the British Welfare State and the 'free enterprise' governments of France, Belgium, Italy, and West Germany."⁵ A week later it revealed its own discouragement by asking "what emerges?" from the ashes of the abortive Schuman Plan negotiations. It gave its own answer in the following complaint:

The Labour Party has now publicly pinned its faith to Atlantic Union, and expressly repudiated the concept which Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin both favored two years ago, of a Third Force, mediating between capitalist America and Soviet Russia.⁶

BRITISH-AMERICAN FRICTIONS

One fairly modest event took place during the early part of 1950 to mar the growing smoothness of Anglo-American relations: British recognition of Communist China, which took place on January 6, 1950, and which was formally announced from London "at high noon" of the same day, according to one solemn account appearing in the American press. The almost universal approval of this move in Britain took into consideration that America's China policy was enmeshed in domestic politics, and that the British action represented no more than freedom to move where before long American policy would surely also go. Soul-searching editorials in the British press revealed overwhelming approval of the logic of the move, and mainly regret, as *The Observer* argued on January 8, 1950, that the United States could not have gone along. "The delay," it noted, "might have been lengthy if we had decided to wait for America." Lengthy indeed!

⁵ See *New Statesman and Nation*, June 10, 1950, p. 645.

⁶ See *New Statesman and Nation*, June 17, 1950, p. 673.

⁷ See *The Times*, May 17, 1956.

Anglo-American divergence over China, harmless as it appeared at the outset to most observers not caught up in the intense emotionalism of the China Question, soon began to cast a dark shadow over general American-British relations, particularly in the heavy seas of the Korean War that broke out in June, 1950. At the very least, it should be said that the divergence added immeasurably to the strain on Anglo-American relations produced by the Korean War.

Attlee and his government, hobbling through the twilight of an indecisive mandate from the elections of February 23, 1950, to those of October 25, 1951, won more criticism than praise from the United States during the first year of the Korean War. Most of the criticism was singularly undeserved, the product of a characteristic American impatience with complexities in time of stress. Rather uniquely, the staunchness of Attlee's cooperation was conceded by the London *Times* some years later as it noted rising American fears that another Labour government "might transform Britain into an unreliable ally." Hardly Labour's greatest champion, *The Times* readily responded that such a notion "should have been scotched by the record of the Attlee administration, under which the Anglo-American alliance was preserved and proved in peace."⁷

On our part, we were unhappy with the paucity of fighting strength Britain had available throughout the Korean War, and with the pace of her rearmament. On her part, Britain groaned at the price she had to pay for rearmament, and particularly at the insensitive, grabby stockpiling of the American government and economy that led both to crushing inflation and to critical bottlenecks in rearmament for those countries unable to compete with American purchasing power. Moreover, a growing lack of confidence in American leadership emerged from President Truman's announcement, two days after the beginning of the Korean War, of the neutralization of Formosa. Cast and explained simply as a Korean War measure, this particular declaration represented American intervention in the last phase of the Chinese

civil war, and it frightened many people in Britain and elsewhere into believing that the United States planned to use the Korean War as a means of reopening the civil war in China. And surely it can be added that nothing said or done by General MacArthur from this time on until his abrupt dismissal by President Truman ten months later would have helped to correct the suspicions of American intentions that had been so innocently spawned.

PROBLEMS OF REARMAMENT

Tensions developing within the Labour government were in part the product of the regime's desire to meet American criticism of British rearmament pace. In fact because of a disconcerting lack of economic realism, Labour's last national budget, submitted in April, 1951, was so over-committed on rearmament that even Churchill, returning to power, had to cut it back. The resignation of Aneurin Bevan and two other Labour ministers on April 21, 1951, was in fact a dramatized protest against the eating away of Socialist principles through excessive and impractical budgetary demands for rearmament.

It is at this point that British anti-Americanism reached a climax, one that our own preoccupation with the simultaneous but even more dramatic recall of MacArthur gave us little chance to understand. As we saw it in the United States, Bevan's resignation was a petty doctrinaire quarrel over cutting the Welfare State's commitment to supply free teeth in order to help pay the enormous rearmament bill envisaged in the government's budget proposal. Since it had been Bevan, as Minister of Health, who had introduced the free dentures, assumptions about pride of authorship and the unreasoning sanctity of any and all installed Socialist principles were too easily matched with Bevan's presumed if relative disinterest in the war against communism.

Actually, Bevan and his followers had concluded that Western estimates of Soviet military power were mainly the product of American hysteria. Even if they were reasonable, Britain could not rearm at the pace undertaken to please the United States. To us, it

was Socialist teeth versus the war against communism. To Bevan, the ousting of Socialist teeth was a good place to draw the line and to challenge the senseless, destructive unreality of Western rearmament axioms and policies.

Ruffled and mauled by American reactions, Bevan's quarrel took on transatlantic proportions, and led him to direct much of his picturesque Welsh spleen on the United States. Typical of Bevan's fate, this occurred just at a time when American action in the removal of MacArthur made us feel outrageously abused by his behavior. It wasn't that Bevan had been wrong; he had merely been right at the wrong time and for the wrong reasons, and for all of that was simply the wrong person. His reward came nine months later, bitter as it must have tasted, in the following historic exchange in the House of Commons between Churchill—once again in power—and himself:

Churchill: We shall not . . . succeed in spending the £1,250,000,000 (for rearmament) this year, and some of the late Government's programme must necessarily roll forward into a future year. This point was made, I believe, by Mr. Aneurin Bevan after his resignation. I do not reproach the late government on this score . . .

Bevan (interpellating): The Prime Minister has made an exceedingly important statement, the effect of which is that it will not be found possible to spend the £4.7 (million) in the three years. . . . Am I to understand that the Government are abandoning the three years and are adding some unknown period to the length of the rearmament program?

Churchill: . . . I am not wishing to embark on a debate with Mr. Bevan. I was giving him an honorable mention in despatches for having—it appears by accident, perhaps not from the best of motives—happened to be right.

One other footnote to the Anglo-American alliance during Labour's postwar period of power, 1945–1951: the Opposition Bench was dominated by Britain's greatest statesman in recent history, one whose prestige was as enduring in America as in his own country. Churchill was not only the most respected Britisher; he was also Britain's greatest champion of the Anglo-American alliance, and Attlee's severest critic when Labour policies ruffled the United States. Out of

power for six long, austerity-ridden years, Churchill increasingly performed like an inverted Cato, ending every speech with a scolding call to Labour not to destroy the linchpin of British policy: cooperation and alliance with the United States. If one attributes half as much cunning to his tactics as majesty to his language, Churchill was not beyond baiting his opponents into untenable displays of independence which only a staunch Conservative regime could correct. At least he provoked Bevan's *Tribune*, which at the height of the Anglo-American crisis in May, 1951, observed bitterly that Churchill had a remedy: "surrender at almost every point to American demands." As the lead editorial went on:

At the very moment when Britain was being pilloried by MacArthur's gross distortions about British trade with China, Churchill was arguing that we had no right even to mention the question of the flow of supplies, sanctioned by MacArthur, from Japan to China.

Not merely have the Tories constituted themselves as a straight pro-American party; they have tended to throw the weight of their support on the side of the more reactionary American elements.⁸

We pass now to Anglo-American relations in the Conservative era of British politics that began in 1951 and which may close in its thirteenth year of power; first under Churchill, succeeded by Anthony Eden, both wise in the ways of Anglo-American relations. In 1952, it seemed possible to predict, as Britain's Anglo-American historian, H. C. Allen, confidently ventured at the time, "that the unity of the British and American peoples would endure."⁹ It is therefore more than puzzling to recall that the gravest postwar crisis in Anglo-American relations was precipitated by Eden, whose leadership in the Suez crisis of 1956 was as plainly defiance of Britain's subordination to the United States as it was despair over Nasser. It was not that Eden

challenged the assumption of Britain's role as a subordinate ally of the United States, but rather that the unreliability—even sterility—of American leadership at least with reference to British problems in the Middle East had apparently reached a point of intolerability.

One must also recall that on the American side this was the era of John Foster Dulles, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State and a man who had a penchant for attracting the dislike of Britons of all political hues. The British historian, Martin Wight, while hardly sympathetic with Eden or Eden's Suez fiasco, captured the essence of this point by suggesting that "it is difficult to see how any British Foreign Secretary could have dealt better with an ally so uncertain, equivocating, and unreliable as Mr. Dulles."¹⁰ However true or untrue such harsh strictures may have been, as views of Dulles they were hardly uncommon in Britain.

THE IMPACT OF SUEZ

What may be the lesson to be learned from Suez is not the familiar refrain that Britain can no longer go it alone in defiance of the United States; rather, how very small and comparatively short-lived was its impact on Anglo-American relations. Awed by the quick healing of so raw and ugly a sore, Professor Allen closed his 1959 book on the history of Anglo-American relationship with the following rapt passage: "I cannot but ask myself whether the Anglo-American relationship, if it could survive the Suez crisis, can not survive anything?"¹¹

Ever since Suez, the greatest issue to plague Anglo-American relations has been the future of Britain's status as a nuclear power. Britain's rudest shock about its inability to go it alone was as much having to abandon the construction of the ballistic missile, *Blue Streak*, in 1960, as it was the collapse of its 1956 Suez intervention. When nuclear deterrence moved from manned bombers to ballistic missiles, Britain found to its discomfort that it could not afford to stay in the race as an independent nuclear power. It held on to a state of semi-independence when it extended the usefulness of its bomber command

⁸ See *Tribune*, May 18-30, 1951, p. 1.

⁹ See H. C. Allen, *Conflict and Concord*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959) p. 236.

¹⁰ See Martin Wight, "Brutus in Foreign Policy; the Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden," *International Affairs*, July, 1960, p. 307.

¹¹ Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

a few years by contracting to purchase a ballistic missile from the United States that could be launched from its manned bombers. This missile was *Skybolt* and, when in 1962 the United States government solemnly abandoned the heavy costs of its development—in effect killing the missile before it was born—Britain found itself suddenly faced with the prospect of no nuclear striking force whatsoever after the mid-1960's.

The Kennedy-Macmillan meeting in the Bahamas, culminating in the Nassau Agreement of December 21, 1962, rescued Britain by offering *Polaris* missiles for new British submarines in place of *Skybolt* missiles for old British V-Bombers. But even that solace could not deter one of Britain's most qualified defense analysts from informing his BBC audience soon afterwards that the most significant single phenomenon resulting from the cancellation of *Skybolt* was "the sudden excess of malice and rage against the United States."¹² Hardly less graphic was the question put to the Minister of Defense by an influential Conservative M.P. on the eve of the Nassau Agreement, asking if he would convey to the Caribbean-bound Prime Minister:

... that some of us on the side of the House who want to see Britain retain the nuclear deterrent are highly suspicious of some of the American motives . . . (and) will you say that the British people are tired of being pushed around?

Pushed around? Adrift may offer a more accurate image. It was Dean Acheson's biting characterization in his famous West Point speech of December 5, 1962—the one that so aroused the British—that may have hit upon the greatest truth. As Acheson began, "Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role." He went on to argue:

The attempt to play a separate power role—that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a "special relationship" with the United States, a role based on being the head of a "Commonwealth" which has no political structure, unity, or strength . . . this role is about played out.¹³

¹² See Alun Gwynne Jones, "The Role of British Defense," *The Listener*, January 31, 1963, p. 193.

¹³ See *New York Times*, December 6, 1962.

¹⁴ See *New York Times*, January 15, 1963.

¹⁵ See Peter Calvocoressi, "The Gaullist Design for Europe," *The Listener*, June 6, 1963.

But what emerged almost defied prediction. To Acheson it was to be Britain's re-entry into Europe, "from which it was banished at the time of the Plantagenets." Three and a half weeks later, de Gaulle vetoed Britain's entry into Europe's Common Market, ironically on the grounds that British membership would only lead to a "colossal Atlantic community under American domination and direction which would have quickly absorbed the European Community."¹⁴ The humiliation of being rejected so bluntly—even with a kind of Gallic cruelty—seems to have masked the more basic reaction of relief in Britain that Edward Heath and all his associates in the Brussels negotiations would not succeed in returning triumphant with a document which would force them to stand and be counted: Europe or no, in or out, for or against. This, at least, is implicit in the remarks of one of Britain's keenest observers in foreign affairs—one of the few sufficiently detached at the time to give de Gaulle his due in the following remarks:

DeGaulle's attitude to Britain has force because his main point about Britain is obviously true. Those British, he says, are not really European, do not feel European, and are asking to join our community not because they are keen to do so but because somebody has told them that they must.¹⁵

If anything suggests itself, it would be a stronger North Atlantic community identification for Britain, regardless of whether Conservatives or Labour wins the next election—an identification that will develop at the expense of both the "special relationship" role with the United States and the European identification as a partner (actual or incipient) in the drive toward European unity. Possibly the key to it all will be the future of

(Continued on page 307)

Ross N. Berkes, a contributing editor, is well-known to the readers of *Current History*. On sabbatical leave in 1955-1956, he studied British foreign policy at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. He is co-author of *Diplomacy in India* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

"There are strange paradoxes in British politics today," says this expert on British affairs, "discontent in the midst of well-being; complaints about economic stagnation at a time when the economy is growing . . . and likely to continue to do so for months ahead." Nonetheless, he continues, there are "signs of an underlying vitality that augurs well for the future of Britain, no matter what party is in office."

Politics in Britain

By THOMAS P. PEARDON

Professor of Government, Barnard College

SINCE THE legal term of Parliament in Britain is five years and the present Parliament was chosen in October, 1959, an election must be held not later than October, 1964. This article is being written before the dissolution of Parliament and the announcement of a polling date, and before the parties have issued their campaign manifestoes, but, in a sense, the campaign is already under way. Both the Conservative Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Harold Wilson, Leader of the Labour Opposition, are giving public speeches with increasing frequency although neither is presenting very detailed proposals. In Parliament, too, both debate and legislation are clearly aimed at winning votes throughout the country.

In a broad sense, one may say that British politics today are concerned with three main issues. The first of these is economic growth. In spite of the prosperity prevailing in 1964, there is a widespread belief that economic growth must be encouraged. The problem is, in Harold Wilson's words, to "galvanize our sluggish, fitful economy." Unless this can be done, it is felt social justice and political power cannot be attained.

The Conservatives have come to rely on a combination of private enterprise and a certain amount of public planning. On the one hand, they have reduced taxes and are in the process of legislating the end of retail price

maintenance by manufacturers. On the other hand, they have set up a National Economic Development Council and a National Incomes Commission. Neither of these bodies has more than advisory powers but it is hoped that their studies and recommendations will secure planned and sound economic growth while avoiding increases in wages and prices beyond what are economically permissible through increased production.

Labour no longer relies so strongly on nationalization in its proposals as it once did. It does propose to renationalize steel and road haulage and talks about controlling "the commanding heights" of the economy. But nationalization is supplemented by proposals to have the state share ownership in industries with private capital. Moreover, in his speeches in the winter of 1963-1964, Mr. Wilson talked about a policy of discriminatory taxation to favor progressive enterprises, especially those that produced for export. It is not clear, however, just how this policy would be applied in practice.

It is also true that Labour's opponents do not seem quite so worried as they once were about the question of ownership. It is true that business interests have been conducting an advertising campaign against public ownership. But it has been observed that not even the steel industry seems to be greatly disturbed at the prospect of nationalization.

The second category of issues is social. It is partly a matter of improving the public services, partly of transforming social relations. A great deal has been done since 1945 to rehouse the nation—three and one-third million houses having been built by 1960—but much remains to be done. Here the Conservatives lean to private enterprise and the needs of the middle class while Labour leans to public housing for the workers.

Education is another subject of noisy debate in this category. Legislation passed in 1944 has never been implemented fully. There are not enough schools, not enough teachers, too few universities. The school leaving age has just been raised to 16 but the new age will not be effective until 1970. Both parties are committed to educational expansion. In particular, the next government (whatever its political complexion) will spend a great deal of money on technical and scientific education and research.

Also, some means must be found of stopping the exodus of scientists which has been publicized so much lately. Scientists and technicians are indispensable if Britain's economy is to be brought up to date in an age of automation and computers. The cult of the amateur must be replaced by that of the expert. Public opinion is aroused on the issue of science and education. It is a measure of Harold Wilson's political astuteness that he seems to have sensed the importance of this issue before his rivals. Many observers think that he has won great support among the younger managers, scientists, and technicians by associating the Labour party's image with "the scientific revolution."

Nor are these the only public services that must be improved. More money will have to be spent on building hospitals and improving health services in general. The railways must be modernized, and roads built for the automobiles that are increasing so rapidly with the prosperity of 1963 and 1964.

On all these matters, and on others such as regional development and urban renewal, the Conservatives can truthfully argue that

they have done a good deal, although they may not have done as much as they could have done. But where the parties disagree most in social matters is on that which pertains to what we may call the structure of society. A new educated class has been brought into existence, but the public school boys and the graduates of "Oxbridge" fare better than the products of schools supported by local authorities and the graduates of "Red-brick."

Exclusiveness, it has been said, is characteristic of British politics, the civil service, the administration of justice and the hierarchy of the Church of England. Snobbery and social inequality remain, supported not only by differences in school background, but by those of accent, and by institutions such as titles, all the way from knighthoods up through the ranks of the peerage. Some people think that radio, television and the spread of education will ultimately produce a standard English speech and pronunciation such as prevail so largely in the United States. Such would be a mighty contribution towards the attainment of that goal of equality which has been the main inspiration of the Labour movement throughout its history.

Labour argues that a new society based on equality, including equality of opportunity, would mobilize the full resources of the people and involve everyone in the public business. As Harold Wilson said in a speech at Birmingham:

We want a Britain in which everyone, not a small clique or class, feel themselves to be part of a process of new policy-making, of taking national decisions, where every home, every club, every pub is its own Parliament in miniature thrashing out the issues of the day.¹

Conservatives do not feel so strongly on this matter. Yet the objections made to the selection of a Fourteenth Earl as Party leader, the refusal of Iain Macleod and Enoch Powell to serve in the Home cabinet, and the controversy over the way in which Conservative leaders in general are chosen are all indications that, among Conservatives as well as Socialists, there are men who feel the need for changes in social arrangements, at least

¹ Quoted by David Watt in *The Spectator*, London, February 7, 1964.

to the extent of opening a career to talents.

Underlying all else is, thirdly, the problem of Britain's place in the world—the adjustment to her decline in power. This problem is partly political and partly economic. Where can she find the new and larger markets that are necessary to support her industry? Where can she find firm political associations which can give her assurance of help in time of trouble and channels of influence at all times? How can she stay at what Sir Alec Douglas-Home calls the "top table" in international diplomacy?

In answering these questions, the Conservatives stress the "independent nuclear deterrent" and, from 1961 to 1963, entry to the Common Market. Labour prefers to stress the build-up of conventional forces and the development of Commonwealth ties and markets. About the limited potentialities of Commonwealth ties Macmillan spoke rather bluntly at the 1962 Prime Ministers Conference. But President de Gaulle's veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market has caused both parties to consider more hopefully the possibility of Commonwealth development. Both parties of course support the Atlantic Alliance and the closest possible relations with the United States.

Defense is likely to be an important issue in 1964. There are now about 180,000 men in the British forces, all paid volunteers. This "red line" may be too thin to enable Britain to live up to her Nato commitments while retaining mobile and reserve forces large enough to make possible speedy response when trouble occurs overseas as it did in so many places (Malaysia, Cyprus, East Africa, and so forth) in the winter of 1963-1964. But how can more recruits be secured? Perhaps it can be done by higher pay and more benefits for the members of the forces, as has been advocated on both sides. A return to conscription is not politically possible, for the present at least.

ELECTORAL STRATEGY

It seems likely that the 1964 campaign will be even more like an American election than 1959 was. Some think that Labour in par-

ticular will copy the Kennedy strategy of 1960. Wilson calls for a scientific and technological revolution to get the country moving again. He is pragmatic rather than doctrinaire in his proposals, hoping to appeal to the young technicians and managers. The Labour campaign is likely to be streamlined and rather expensive, making much use of advertising and posters and of opinion research to identify the issues that are of interest to the voters. Television debates are already being arranged to present the opposing teams to the public. But the election will probably be mainly a choice between Sir Alec and Wilson as Prime Ministers. It will be, in the judgment of qualified students, the most "presidential" election in British history.

NEW LEADERS

The election is made more interesting, and the outcome less certain, by the fact that both parties find themselves under new leadership. In this respect the Labour party has had more time to test and season its new chief than have the Conservatives. When Hugh Gaitskill died unexpectedly in January, 1963, Harold Wilson was elected as his successor on the second ballot taken by the Labour members of Parliament. Wilson was a relatively young man of 46 who was generally thought of as belonging to the left wing of the Party. It was feared that this might lead to disunity in the Party and loss of strength among the voters. However, Wilson was able to rally the Party behind him. Except for some infighting during the summer of 1963, largely concerned over the control of economic policy in the next Labour government, this unity has continued. It was especially conspicuous at the Party conference in Scarborough in October, 1963. This was the first Party conference since Wilson had been chosen as leader and presented a united front to the public.

Wilson has striven equally hard to remove any trace of Bevanite radicalism from his public image. He seems to have been successful in presenting himself to the voters as a man worthy to be considered for the office of prime minister, the essence of moderation, statesmanship and responsibility. In skill as

a politician he has been compared to David Lloyd George. He is sensitive to varying opinion, skilled in compromising opposing views.

The problems of Conservative leadership have been more difficult to solve. In October, 1963, Harold Macmillan announced his intention to give up the prime ministership. After a bitter inner-party struggle he was succeeded by the Earl of Home who immediately renounced his peerage and became Sir Alec Douglas-Home. At a by-election in Kinross, Scotland, he was elected to the House of Commons and was able to meet Parliament on November 14, when it resumed its sittings following the autumn recess.

Unlike Labour, the Conservatives do not elect their leader. Instead, they allow him to "emerge" after what are known as "the usual processes of consultation." Conservative M.P.'s, peers and Party leaders outside Parliament are all asked to give their first and second choices, as well as the name of anyone to whom they are particularly opposed. The aim is to get the man who can best keep the Party united as well as electorally strong.

In 1957, when Macmillan succeeded Eden, this process of consultation was carried out after the Prime Minister's resignation by emissaries acting on behalf of the Queen. In 1963, however, Macmillan did not resign until he was able to recommend his successor in a formal memorandum to the Queen. Of course, she still had the constitutional right to take further soundings, but did not do so. Instead, she sent for Lord Home.

Lord Home was only one of several men seeking to become Macmillan's successor. There was R. A. Butler, then First Secretary of State, who had done so much to refurbish Tory policy after the defeat in 1945. He had strong support in the Cabinet, but many back-benchers in Parliament disliked him for his progressive views. Some, too, remembered that he had supported Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy before the war. Others objected to his cold intellectuality, his inability to suffer fools gladly.

Another aspirant, more aggressive than any of the others, was Viscount Hailsham, then

Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science. He was popular in the constituencies but many members of Parliament disliked his personality. He lost ground too, by the excited ardor with which he pursued his aim.

Butler and Hailsham were thought of as the leading candidates, but some support went to Reginald Maudling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. And of course there were others who would have been willing to assume the burdens, not to mention the rewards, of office. What seems to have happened is that Butler and Hailsham were deadlocked while Maudling waited too long before switching his support. Meanwhile, Lord Home was showing a good deal of strength, as he had done for months, and was chosen by Macmillan.

THE NEW PRIME MINISTER

The selection of Home gave bitter offense to some elements in the Party. He was 60 years old, a peer, and believed to be to the right of center if not even reactionary. Two members of the Cabinet (Iain Macleod and Enoch Powell) refused to serve under him. In an article published later in *The Spectator* (of which he had become editor) Macleod charged that Macmillan had always been determined to keep Butler out of the prime ministership and had engineered the choice of Home to this end. He further charged that nine men had been most responsible for conducting the soundings and negotiations by which Party opinion was meant to be discovered. Of these, he said, eight had gone to Eton.

Cool observers were not disposed to accept the conspiracy theory. But it was obvious at the time that feelings were running high in some Tory quarters, especially between the more conservative and the more progressive wings, between the aristocrats and their supporters, on the one side, and the "new men" in the Party on the other. Consequently, it has been suggested that the Conservatives had better adopt a different method of choosing their leaders in future and the new Prime Minister has promised that an inquiry into the question will be made after the Election.

It is too soon to make a serious appraisal of Sir Alec as leader and Prime Minister. His assets are charm, intelligence, and aristocratic background and manner. A surprising appointment as Foreign Secretary in 1960, he proved to be an excellent choice. His quiet manner serves him well on television and he has done well in the House of Commons.

On the other hand, his manner and appearance recall to many the old England which they regard as passé. He is said to have doubts about the United Nations, about the viability of the African states and about the possibility of ending the cold war with Russia. He is clearly more interested and more at home in foreign than in domestic affairs. At public meetings he reads his speeches badly. Some think that he is too old, and not dynamic enough to lead the country and the Party in these times. He looks like the perfect amateur rather than the herald of a scientific and technological era. Yet Macmillan, according to one story, says that he is "iron painted to look like lath." One should not forget that men laughed when A. J. Balfour became Irish Secretary in 1887. They said that he was a dilettante and weakling and that the Irish would break him. But it did not happen.

One of Sir Alec's difficulties is that he may not be in office very long. In 1963, there were 16 by-elections to fill seats in the House of Commons left vacant by death or resignation. Omitting two of these where conditions were not normal, there was a fairly consistent 7.5 per cent swing to Labour. If this should prevail in a general election, *The Economist* and other observers have calculated that Labour would win a majority of over 100. Public opinion polls also have given Labour a distinct lead over the Tories, although, as the election approached, this lead narrowed somewhat. The Tories were given a fighting chance; but rightly or wrongly, most observers expected a Labour win, if only because the people have grown bored of being governed by the same party for 13 years. As the general election drew nearer, the third-party Liberal vote, which had been so high in some by-elections, began to decline. More and

more attention was focused on the major parties.

STRANGE PARADOXES

There are strange paradoxes in British politics today: discontent in the midst of well-being; complaints about economic stagnation at a time when the economy is growing at an annual rate of 5.5 per cent and likely to continue to do so for months ahead. It must be remembered that President de Gaulle's veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market was only one of a series of reverses and strains suffered by the United Kingdom. There was the earlier American cancellation of the Skybolt missile on which the British were depending as a carrier for their nuclear weapons. The shock of this cancellation was dulled by the agreement to provide Polaris missiles instead, but in the meantime British pride had suffered by the revelation of the dependence of its "independent deterrent" on the United States.


At home, unemployment was worse in the winter of 1962-1963 than it had been since the 1930's. The weather, too, was very bad in that winter and the hardship it produced was intensified by a power failure. (At long last the British are now going in for central heating and storm windows.) Crime increased sharply in 1963. Most sensational of all, there was the Profumo scandal.

These events have combined to produce a certain malaise that has often been noted by observers, both British and foreign, the feeling that Britain is falling behind, that her economy needs modernization, that research and education must be expanded, that Britain must learn how to count for more in the world. Even her institutions of government, so long praised at home and abroad, are now being criticized as inadequate mechanisms

(Continued on page 307)

Thomas P. Pardon served as Managing Editor of the *Political Science Quarterly* from 1958 to 1963 and was Associate Dean and Dean of the Faculty at Barnard College from 1950 to 1959.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS



KEY: Members of the Commonwealth of Nations, their dependencies, and all major British dependencies are indicated by the shaded areas or by underlining (see also tables on page 290).

© Crown Copyright, 1963. Used by permission of the Directorate of Overseas Surveys and the Controller of H. M. Stationery Office.

The Commonwealth of Nations

INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

1. United Kingdom	10. Cyprus
2. Canada	11. Sierra Leone
3. Australia	12. Tanganyika
4. New Zealand	13. Jamaica
5. India	14. Trinidad and Tobago
6. Pakistan	15. Uganda
7. Ceylon	16. Federation of Malaysia*
8. Ghana	17. Zanzibar
9. Nigeria	18. Kenya

* Comprises the former independent Federation of Malaya, the State of Singapore, North Borneo (now Sabah) and Sarawak.

MAJOR BRITISH DEPENDENCIES (FEBRUARY, 1964)

AFRICA

- Northern Rhodesia*
- Southern Rhodesia†
- Nyasaland*
- Gambia
- Basutoland
- Bechuanaland
- Swaziland

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

- Brunei
- Hong Kong
- Fiji (including Pitcairn)
- Tonga
- British Solomon Islands
- Gilbert and Ellice Islands
- New Hebrides (Anglo-French Condominium)

MEDITERRANEAN

- Gibraltar
- State of Malta*

* Scheduled for independence in 1964.

† Internally self-governing since 1923.

CARIBBEAN


- Barbados
- Antigua
- Dominica
- Grenada
- Montserrat
- St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguila
- St. Lucia
- St. Vincent
- Cayman Islands
- Turks and Caicos Islands
- British Virgin Islands
- British Guiana
- British Honduras

ATLANTIC AND INDIAN OCEANS

- Bahamas
- Bermuda
- Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia
- Mauritius
- Seychelles
- Falkland Islands and Dependencies
- British Antarctic Territory
- St. Helena (including Ascension and Tristan da Cunha)

Tables courtesy of British Information Services, New York City

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Courtesy of British Information Services, New York City

Juxtaposing Britain against his outline of the role "a dynamic industrialized economy" has to play "in generating world trade, in providing aid for the developing countries, and in contributing effectively to defensive alliances," this economist says that "the relationship and contribution of Britain to the various political groupings and alliances with which it is associated have scarcely been enhanced in its recent period of relative economic decline."

The British Economy

By J. D. FROGGATT

Staff Member, Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd.

To a casual observer unfamiliar with the trends of the past decade the British economy would currently show few signs of any deep-seated malaise. The present level of national income per capita is surpassed in only three or four countries; for the past twelve months it has been rising at an annual rate of some 5 per cent; and the pace is not likely to be substantially slower in the next twelve months. But the current facade of buoyancy and optimism is thin; it neither conceals nor diminishes the urgent need of lasting remedies for basic weaknesses in the economic and social structure that have seriously inhibited the economy's recent progress and that threaten its future health.

The problems that must now be vigorously tackled have been reflected in the slow and spasmodic growth of output. Gross national product (allowing for price changes) expanded at an average annual compound rate of only 2.4 per cent between 1950 and 1960. Moreover, the pace has been slackening; the average rate of growth between 1956 and 1962 was only just over 2 per cent, and periods of virtual stagnation became more frequent and prolonged. In both periods the British economy grew far less rapidly than that of any other major European power; and, whereas in the early 1950's this was partly due to Britain's already higher income level and smaller backlog of war damage, it

has been evident in more recent years that Britain has signally failed to participate in the sustained upsurge of economic growth on the European continent.

It is perhaps too easy to be dazzled by the growth rate comparisons that have become the fashionable yardstick of the strength of industrial economies. Significant differences in the stages of economic advancement and in the balance of resources can be all too easily forgotten or played down. The intrinsic merit of achieving a growth rate one or two percentage points higher than that obtained elsewhere may often be exaggerated or too readily assumed. Yet the advantages—and the need—in an industrially advanced country of a sustained growth rate substantially higher than Britain has managed to attain in recent years are none the less real.

A dynamic industrialised economy has a potentially vital role in generating world trade, in providing aid for the developing countries, and in contributing effectively to defensive alliances. A high and rising level of economic performance should also allow increasing attention to be paid to the more qualitative factors in the economy and to the distribution of the nation's wealth (although Professor J. K. Galbraith has reminded us that this result is not always so readily achieved in practice). In addition, an economy that becomes stagnant at a relatively high level may often

reflect, and help to perpetuate, a stagnant society. One might even suggest that the danger of the development of patches of decay in the social, even political, fabric increases in such circumstances. A direct connection is hard to establish, but the relationship and contribution of Britain to the various political groupings and alliances with which it is associated have scarcely been enhanced in its recent period of relative economic decline.

Why, then, has Britain largely failed to respond to the incentives to achieve a more rapid, sustained rate of growth?

The answer must be sought in the basic factors governing the present structure of the economy and in the national response to these factors. Exactly how the factors and reactions to them have interacted to produce Britain's lagging growth rate is a matter of endless controversy. Any brief interpretation inevitably involves the omission of possible alternative explanations and some sidestepping of the more sophisticated issues. Nonetheless it is possible to pick out the most significant elements in the mixture that has induced this recent economic torpor.

LIMITED LABOUR FORCE

Most fundamental of all is the slow and unbalanced growth of the labour force—the chief ingredient in Britain's economic performance in view of her lack of physical resources. During the 1950's the working-age population rose at an average annual rate of little more than 0.1 per cent. The growing tendency for married women to take jobs and a steady net immigration helped to raise the total number employed by an average of about 0.7 per cent a year; but this is still a relatively slow rate. Moreover, unlike many continental European countries and North America, Britain now has virtually no drift of labour from the land into industry. Until recently, there has also been a tendency for the contraction of industries like the railways, coal mining and shipbuilding, which have been facing secular decline, to outstrip the rationalisation of their labour forces.

Further, we see that labour mobility, on a regional as well as an industrial and occupa-

tional basis, has been insufficient to widen substantially the limits to growth imposed by the slow expansion of the labour force. The percentage rate of unemployment in the north and west of the British Isles has consistently been nearly double the national average of rather under 2 per cent in recent years. Conversely, acute shortages of labour frequently occur, in periods of demand pressure, in the Midlands and in the south and east of England. Shortages on a national scale of skilled fitters, machine-tool setters and operators, sheet-metal workers, plumbers, carpenters and other skilled workers are not uncommon.

It is sometimes assumed that the weakening effects of a slowly expanding labour force on economic growth may be counteracted by a rapid rate of investment—indeed that labour shortages are a positive inducement to investment. Applied generally, the latter assumption has little validity; investment in new plant facilities is unlikely to be profitable if the facilities cannot be adequately manned. Yet certain shortages of labour may be expected to give some incentive to specifically labour-saving investment.

The total volume of gross fixed investment (including that in social projects like housing, schools and hospitals) has not been seriously inadequate in Britain. As a percentage of gross national product at factor cost, this investment was at an average rate of over 15 per cent in the period 1950–1960 and around 18 per cent in 1961 and 1962; and the growth of fixed capital per employee between 1950 and 1960, at nearly 3 per cent a year, compared by no means alarmingly with that of other countries. Yet the returns on this capital outlay in terms of the growth of national output have been falling; the investment has apparently tended to increase capacity more than to economise in the use of labour.

A MYSTERY

Why this should be so, when basic economic factors dictate precisely the opposite emphasis in investment, is something of a mystery. One possible factor is the built-in bias (reduced in the budget of 1963) towards taxes on the use

of capital relative to the use of labour. Another is that the cost of capital, as well as labour, has been high in recent years; this may have reduced the incentive to invest in labour-saving equipment more than it deterred the expansion of capacity to meet periodic shortages of certain goods. Yet another is that even labour-saving investment is often in large-scale indivisible units that are bound to expand capacity simultaneously, perhaps by more than is economically desirable. But also, it is hard to escape the conclusion that too much postwar investment has been inadequately planned to give maximum returns—not only on a national level, but to individual firms as well. In the latter case, future demand has sometimes been miscalculated; and the use of faulty means of determining the relative rate of return on investments of different kinds may also have affected the quality of investment decisions.

These characteristics of postwar investment have helped to inhibit the rise in labour productivity on which the growth of the British economy must clearly depend. Output per capita of the employed labour force grew at an average annual compound rate of less than 1.7 per cent between 1950 and 1962, a rate easily surpassed by the other major European countries.

COST INFLATION

The combination of the slow growth of the labour force and the weak rise of labour productivity has also helped to induce cost inflation. Periodic shortages of labour have undoubtedly contributed towards trade union success in bargaining for wage increases well in excess of rises in labour productivity, which thus tend to raise unit production costs. Weekly wage rates increased in all industries and services between January, 1956, and the beginning of 1963 at an average annual compound rate of over 4 per cent. (Cf. the increase in output per employee shown above.)

The trouble has stemmed from the tendency for the wage increases obtained in key industries, where the rise in productivity might justify them, to be successfully taken as precedents in industries where no such justification

exists. The fact that certain public sector industries have often granted rises not justified by improved productivity, and that these have sometimes been achieved through official arbitration machinery, has reinforced the tendency. Moreover, the common system of bargaining for wage increases on a uniform national basis has meant that negotiated wage increases in such major industries as engineering have merely raised the floor above which the individual local agreements are made; and it is the latter that must take account of the local labour supply and demand conditions and evaluate the particular plant's productivity level.

Local labour market conditions are also reflected in the prevalence of overtime payments and bonuses; since 1956, total weekly earnings in industry have risen over one-third more quickly than wages. Thus, in many areas, nationally negotiated wage increases are superimposed on rises rooted more firmly in basic economic conditions. These trends in wage earnings, together with increases in salaries (which have been greater than those in wages), profits and dividends have led to considerable cost inflation. Given the need that exists for the redeployment of labour, it is doubtful whether inflation purely of the type in which demand pushes beyond the limits of productive capacity has been present in substantial amount in Britain in recent years.

In turn, cost inflation has had repercussions in another sensitive area of Britain's economy—the balance of payments. The volume of imports rose at an average annual compound rate of 4.1 per cent between 1956 and 1962, just over twice as fast as gross national product, and manufactured imports expanded fastest of all. Meanwhile, the volume of exports increased by only 1.7 per cent a year and Britain's share of world exports of manufactures dipped from 20.9 per cent in 1953 to 15.1 per cent in 1962.

Several comparatively reassuring partial explanations can be found for these trends: Britain must always import large quantities of agricultural produce; imports of raw materials are bound to increase rapidly in phases

of fast industrial expansion; the removal of import controls accounts for some of the particularly sharp rise in manufactured imports in 1959 and 1960. Similarly, the slow growth in Britain's traditional export markets may be held to account for part of the poor export performance. But the basic factor has almost certainly been the relatively rapid rise of unit costs in manufacturing, exacerbated from time to time by delayed delivery dates resulting from labour shortages and other production bottlenecks. Had not the terms of trade moved strongly in Britain's favour during the 1950's and early 1960's, the deficit on merchandise trade would have been substantially wider. Even so, despite the surplus on international transactions in services, a current account surplus of comfortable proportions (say £250-300 million) has not been recorded since 1958, which was a year of recession and sagging imports.

The hyper-sensitivity of Britain's economy to external considerations is, however, a result not only of the recent dismal trading performance but also of the pound sterling's role (along with the U.S. dollar) as a reserve currency. A large volume of funds is constantly held by non-sterling area countries in sterling accounts and securities, from which quick withdrawal is possible. Outward shifts of such funds—in response to relative movements in international interest rates, to fears of the effects of inflation and trade deficits on the value of sterling, or unsettling events, such as France's rejection of Britain's application to join the E.E.C.—are potentially damaging to Britain's overall external solvency. The threat implicit in this situation has been a factor seriously curtailing the room for economic maneuver.

The interconnected problems of labour shortages, cost-push inflation and external deficit with pressure on the pound have persistently bedevilled the sustained expansion of the British economy. Each time demand has been stimulated into a phase of relatively vigorous growth, the emergence of some combination of these problems has induced

official action that has brought the expansion prematurely to a halt. Certainly the government itself can scarcely escape all the blame for the stuttering progress of the economy since the mid-1950's.

Criticism is valid on two main fronts. First, the timing of measures taken to damp down demand—mainly credit and hire purchase restrictions, increased indirect taxes, and restraints on public spending—has often appeared faulty. Delays in their imposition have meant the ultimate introduction of measures more severe than they need have been. Moreover, it is difficult to gauge accurately the incidence of some of the cruder measures taken—cuts in public spending, for example, are notoriously hard to phase accurately. The deflationary moves of July, 1961, for example, were made when the economy looked to be coming “off the boil” without much official assistance. In addition, there is little doubt that the government underestimated the severity of the deflationary moves and the degree of the economy's response.

Secondly, and more important, the official diagnosis of the economy's condition, at least since 1956, has surely been at fault. Whole volumes have been written debating this contention in detail; controversy will continue. The main points, however, seem to be these: what is basically cost-push inflation has been confused with demand inflation, whose prevalence has at the same time been overestimated; and the contributions of chronic trade imbalance, and of the strains incurred through the reserve currency status of sterling, to the weakness of the external payments position have been insufficiently distinguished. The result is that remedies prescribed to meet this official diagnosis have put the emphasis too much on the indiscriminate restriction of domestic demand.

In fact, periodic constraints on the expansion of total demand have hit disproportionately hard the growth industries, which tend to be capital intensive and in which the all-important labour productivity factor tends to be comparatively high. The reason, as Norman Macrae has recently stressed,¹ is

¹ See Norman Macrae, *Sunshades in October*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963).

that marginal demand for their products—cars and other consumer durables—is relatively high: extra purchasing power generated in phases of vigorous expansion is channelled increasingly towards such goods; when real income stagnates, demand for the goods in this category diminishes more than proportionately. Moreover, goods in this group mostly attract heavy purchase taxes and are often bought on credit, making them particularly susceptible to the sort of deflationary measures that have been taken. By creating an unduly large amount of surplus capacity in the high-productivity growth industries, government measures have thus helped to inhibit the increase in labour productivity, to reduce the incentive for labour to gravitate towards them, and to contribute to the overall rise in unit costs—the very factors that lie at the roots of so many of Britain's postwar economic difficulties.

STRUCTURAL REFORM

Conversely, far too little attention has been paid in the past to structural reform designed to enable the economy to meet rising demand without all too quickly feeling the strains described above. Encouragingly, the focus of official economic policy has shifted belatedly, slowly yet quite dramatically, in this direction in the past three years. If the breakdown of the negotiations for E.E.C. membership had no other salutary consequences, it probably acted as a catalyst in a process that had already started—a growing realisation that economic weaknesses would have to be tackled deliberately and at their roots. The speed and determination with which the new theme of economic growth and modernisation is translated into action are highly relevant to the question of how long the present recovery of economic activity can be sustained, for the basic factors likely to strangle expansion are still no less real.

Things are at last moving. Through the medium of the National Economic Development Council, consistent growth (optimistically put at four per cent a year) now has priority in the government's economic thinking. The favourable psychological implica-

tions of putting this objective in the place of the old "go-stop-go" mentality that was sapping business confidence may themselves be considerable. Again, efforts are being made at a direct assault on cost inflation; ways of keeping rises in incomes and prices in line with the growth of national productivity are now almost constantly in the forefront of public discussion. Led by coal mining and the railways, the old industries in relative decline, which also include cotton textiles, shipbuilding, heavy steel and certain branches of heavy engineering, are now undergoing quite rapid rationalisation.

Much more must now be done to complement these trends by stimulating technical research in modern industry and practical innovation in the use of labour-saving equipment; recent trends are encouraging, but there is much slack. Similarly, reform of the anachronistic apprenticeship system, more facilities for training and retraining skilled labour, better incentives to both occupational and regional labour mobility, and a more comprehensive national policy to achieve regional balance in economic activity, must all be pushed far beyond the small beginnings recently made.

Progress seems fated to be slow. The approach so far is largely empirical, not radical. Tradition dies hard. The breaking down of entrenched positions and lingering mutual distrust of management and labour on the vexing question of wages, profits and prices is so slow as to be scarcely perceptible; at least discussion continues. Similarly, the structure and distribution of industry will not be streamlined overnight. Workers are chary

(Continued on page 308)

J. D. Froggatt is a graduate of the London School of Economics, where he took a first-class honours degree in economics. He now specializes in the analysis of current trends in the economies of North America and the United Kingdom at the Economist Intelligence Unit in London. His work also includes several studies on international trade and finance.

“Despite rhetorical appeal to public opinion . . . in its actual operations British policy disregarded ideological principles,” points out this historian, who believes that “The balance of power was the instinct of English statesmen before the time of William III and their avowed policy ever since.”

The Roots of British Foreign Policy

By SAMUEL J. HURWITZ
Visiting Professor of History, University of the West Indies

IT HAS BEEN said that Great Britain, with “one foot in the sea and one on the shore,” is “to one thing constant never.” Lord Salisbury and Otto von Bismarck agreed that British policy could never be uniform or consistent because it had to be based upon an evanescent public opinion. Salisbury, in fact, asserted that there was no such thing as a fixed policy “because like all organic entities policy is always in the making.”

Yet, in its essentials, British foreign policy during the last three centuries has been remarkably consistent. The charge of “Perfidious Albion” has been leveled against Great Britain by those who relied on understandings, promises and even treaties and then discovered that British interests and only British interests determined Britain’s actions. As Lord Palmerston warned, England has no eternal friendships and eternal enemies, only eternal interests. Its friendship is based on loyalty to its own best interests, and its enemies are those who threaten its position. England has acted out Hegel’s words, “the interest of the state is the highest morality.”

Methods and means have differed with the time, the circumstances, and the personalities, but every Prime Minister has acted in accordance with the principle articulated by Canning, that “with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy.” The creed, “every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost,” applied also to foreign policy.

For every country, its geographical position is the framework of its foreign policy and, to use the words of Jules Cambon, “indeed the chief reason why a foreign policy is necessary at all.” The conditioning, if not the determining factor, of Britain’s foreign policy since the middle of the seventeenth century was the “immutable conditions of her geographical situation.” A small island lying only a short distance off the coast of a continent of powerful peoples, dependent on the development and exploitation of overseas connections and interests, Britain has been extremely conscious of the importance of sea power.

As a commercial power, with a high level of world trade, Britain has sought to maintain the peace. War interrupted and interfered with world commerce upon which the wealth and strength of Britain depended. “Peace with honor,” and “peace with justice,” were high-sounding slogans; the unspoken but implicit motto was, “I do not care for justice, I care for peace.” The term “peace-loving” was used to describe Britain by Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office in a secret memorandum written on New Year’s Day, 1907; a memorandum that was later to become public and famous. Earlier, Disraeli had publicly boasted that a powerful England would maintain the peace of Europe. Dedicated to peace if possible, it was British policy to attempt to limit the occasion and area of conflict. British statesmen sought to avoid entanglements which might draw the country into conflicts

which did not affect various British interests. Peace was important but not paramount. More basic, Britain did not hesitate to go to war if it found itself in danger. By definition this danger was present when any of the three chief goals of British policy was threatened. Despite the warnings of Lord Acton that absolute principle was as wicked as absolute power, British governments down the years have held the following principles sacred and have based their foreign policy on them:

1. That no power or combination of powers should be able to deprive Britain of control of the seas, particularly the waters which surround the British Isles. Thus, Britain had to maintain a navy which would be stronger than that of any likely combination of powers.
2. That no hostile power should control the European shores of the English Channel. Thus, Britain was determined to maintain the independence of the Low Countries lest a "hostile gun" be aimed from across the Channel.
3. That no single power should be able to dominate the continent of Europe. Thus, Britain sought to maintain the balance of power. This meant that Britain would throw its strength on the side of the lesser power or combination of powers, not for reasons of chivalry, but to safeguard "external interests."

These principles were closely interrelated; the failure to uphold any one of them threatened the whole. Accepted as virtual maxims for three centuries, it was axiomatic that every British government would try to uphold them; failing means short of war, then war itself would be invoked.

The Navy was the chief means of enforcing British policy. Dependent on the sea, the keystone of Britain's independence as a nation was sea power. England's need for an invincible navy dates from the sixteenth century. The "two-power standard" of naval strength—that the British Navy should be stronger than the combined fleets of any two likely combinations of powers—is as old as

the time of the Earl of Chatham, 1770. Richard Cobden and others rediscovered the principle after the Crimean War. It was formally and publicly proclaimed on March 7, 1889, by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George Hamilton. In 1904, and down to the outbreak of the First World War, the Government sought to build up and to maintain naval strength ten per cent above the two-power standard. As Balfour said, this margin was necessary because after an exhausting conflict with two maritime powers, Britain might find herself at the mercy of some *tertius gaudens* with an intact navy.

This unquestioned superiority was threatened by the German Naval laws of 1898 and 1900 which called for the building of a navy so powerful that "if the strongest naval power engaged it, it would endanger its own supremacy." Obviously there could be no common meeting ground—outside of actual battle—if Britain and Germany insisted on their respective policies. Little wonder that the British public, steeped in the tradition of the supremacy and the invincibility of their navy, was influential in the debate over the size of the navy that took place within the prewar Liberal government.

The dispute was whether to build four or six dreadnoughts. A "compromise" was reached: eight were to be built. A public cry had gone up, "we want eight and we won't wait," and the Government was forced to go along. Admiral Fisher of Dreadnought fame had earlier exclaimed in exasperation that as he came to know more government leaders his faith in Providence deepened: "How otherwise could one explain Britain's existence as a great power?" But the tradition and the insistence on its maintenance weighed heavier than the weakness of individuals and compelled any Government in office to accept and act on it.

THE PAX BRITANNICA

The *Pax Britannica* was guaranteed by the strength of the British Navy, but British security could still be threatened from the European coast. Control of Belgium by a strong and possibly (if not inevitably) hostile power

would be like a "pistol aimed at the heart of England." Within a 300-mile radius of the port of London lie all of England and Wales; Holland and Belgium; Paris, and the northern coast and principle industrial areas of France. British foreign policy aimed at preventing a single great power from controlling the coast of continental Europe opposite the Thames estuary.

That the British Navy should rule supreme and that the Low Countries should not be ruled from the outside were basic assumptions of British foreign policy, accepted by the great majority of the British people. The independence of Holland after it had ceased to be a threat and, from 1830 on, of Belgium, were likewise principles of publicly proclaimed policy that won the unstinted adherence of wide sectors of the public. The citizens who, in 1914, shouted, "To Hell with Serbia," wept over Belgium.

Less was said—but much was done—about "the balance of power." This concept was the subject of violent abuse and was rarely defended under its name. Eyre Crow, writing a secret memorandum for his official superiors, could assert that it was an "historical truism" to identify England with the maintenance of the balance of power but, as the term had become pejorative and even anathema to many, British statesmen were generally careful to avoid its use. Lord Grey has confessed that he deliberately avoided the term. Asquith, the Prime Minister, took care to substitute the phrase, "community of power." The use of the phrase could be avoided or it could be translated into an acceptable euphemism, but the principle remained. In January, 1948, Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Minister in the Labor government, criticized the concept of the balance of power but at the same time, insisted that it was the "first principle" of British policy that no nation should be permitted to dominate Europe.

In itself the principle of the balance of power called for a "just equilibrium" among the family of nations so that no one of them would become sufficiently powerful to enforce its will upon the others. It was the principle of "divide"; but the purpose of dividing was

not to rule but rather to guarantee against being ruled. An obvious maxim of self-preservation based, as it was, on common sense and experience, it was advocated and utilized whenever it was applicable. The Greeks may not have had a word for it but the concept of the balance of power was responsible for the Peloponnesian War. For, after its decline as a great power, Athens sought to guarantee its own survival by seeking to preserve the balance. With the establishment of overwhelming power, such as was achieved first by Macedon and later by Rome, Charlemagne, and the Holy Roman Empire, the balance of power fell into desuetude as an operating principle in foreign affairs, however it may have been used by contestants for power within the empires.

NATIONS AND THE POWER BALANCE

With the rise of "national" states, each a rival of the others, the principle of the balance of power was revived. In a world where national life was "nasty, brutish, and short" and violence was the final if not the first arbiter, the balance of power was invoked to prevent the need for invoking war on a larger scale, the court of last resort. Hobbes' explanation in the *Leviathan* is applicable: "For war consisteth not in battle only or in the art of Fighting; but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known."

In a world of national powers, so long as power was either widely divided or evenly distributed, no one country was all powerful. Care had to be taken to prevent aggrandizement which would tend to destroy the balance. Thus the invasion of Italy in 1494 by Charles VII of France and his claim to the Kingdom of Naples resulted in the first great European combination of otherwise hostile powers. The Turk was fought by one Christian ruler and was simultaneously the ally of another Christian ruler. Francis I of France was allied with the Turkish Sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, against Charles V. Henry VIII aided Francis I in the Thirty Years War against Hapsburg hegemony. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 was intended to

interpose effective barriers against the expansion of territory and power by the Hapsburgs. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 expressly had as its purpose *conservandum in Europa equilibrium*. As England became increasingly important, its position against the possibility of the possession of overwhelming power by others hardened.

No equilibrium remained stable; some nations grew while others declined. Constant to its own interests, England could not therefore be constant to its allies. Both in 1713 and in 1763, Great Britain concluded a separate peace without consulting the allies whom she was pledged to consult. Palmerston, who was the least discreet of the British Foreign Secretaries, frankly admitted, in 1841, that no country would honor a treaty which was injurious to its interests.

Fearful that the domination of the European continent was only a prelude to the domination of England, England was the backbone of coalitions against Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV, the French Revolutionaries, Napoleon, Wilhelm II, and Hitler. Great Britain participated in the great wars of modern times because it could not sever its connection with and interest in European and world affairs. As Palmerston said, if commerce were important, if continental military forces existed, if one power could become dangerous to others, then it was impossible for Great Britain to remain uninterested. In the words of Henry VII, *Cui adherco praeest*—“the one whom I support will get the upper hand.” Always, there was a calculation of forces so that, in the words of Salisbury, England would not put its money “on the wrong horse.” Not, generally, able to help with large numbers of troops, England was able to turn the balance because of its navy and its role as the “paymaster of coalitions.” Separated from the continent by geography, religion and political developments, and with an insularity of temperament and desire, the Englishman in his “tight little island” nevertheless could not permit himself the luxury of isolation, no matter how splendid.

Despite rhetorical appeal to public opinion at home and abroad, in its actual operations

British policy disregarded ideological principles. Charles James Fox had pointed out that the hatred of sin is no just cause of war between nations. As Palmerston informed Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, changes in internal constitution are the domestic concern of the respective nation, but an attempt by one nation to seize the territory of another is a different matter because it upsets the existing equilibrium (Palmerston, indeed, used the term “Balance of Power”) and the British government was free to interfere on the “universally acknowledged principle of self-defence.”

Earlier, in 1820, Castlereagh had vowed that Britain would go to war to enforce the “territorial balance” of Europe. As Austin Chamberlain said in 1925, all of Britain’s greatest wars have been fought to prevent one great military power from dominating Europe, the coasts of the channel, and the ports of the low countries. Neville Chamberlain would not involve Britain in war for the sake of enforcing treaty obligations or to protect the innocent, but he would—and did—resist the attempt to dominate the world. The balance of power was the instinct of English statesmen before the time of William III and their avowed policy ever since.

The roots of British foreign policy grew deep through the years and, like the mighty oak, Britain grew great and its roots seemed ever more firmly embedded. Able to prevent any major power from dominating the European continent, Britain was secure. That this happy situation could not last forever was recognized by responsible statesmen who real-

(Continued on page 307)

Samuel J. Hurwitz, Associate Professor of History at Brooklyn College, is currently teaching at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica under a Fulbright Fellowship. In 1953–1954, he won a Faculty Fellowship from the Fund for Advancement of Education. Professor Hurwitz is the author of *State Intervention in Great Britain* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949) and co-author of *Some Modern Historians of Britain* (New York: Dryden Press, 1951).

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOKS ON BRITAIN

THE FASCISTS IN BRITAIN. By COLIN CROSS. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963. 214 pages, note on sources, photographs, index, \$5.00.)

Oswald Mosley marched off the British political stage in 1931 in a heroic mood: "Better the great adventure, better the great attempt for England's sake, better defeat, disaster, better by far the end of that trivial thing called a political career than stifling in the uniform of blue and gold, strutting and posturing on the stage of Little England amid the scenery of decadence. . ." The adventure, which began with the withdrawal of the young aristocrat from the Labour party and took him to the leadership of British Fascism, ended with his imprisonment in 1940.

Cross's history of Mosley and of his British Union of Fascists (B.U.F.) is fascinating reading. Could the career of this ex-Tory imperialist who had risen so fast and so high in the ranks of Labour be anything but engrossing? Beatrice Webb had called him the "most brilliant man in the House of Commons." Aneurin Bevan and John Strachey were his friends. Many predicted a career culminating in a Prime Ministership. The depression altered all this. In 1930, he proposed to his party a wide-ranging set of measures aimed at reviving the economy and ending unemployment by means of heavy state intervention of a more centralized government. In essence Mosley was calling for a siege economy. When the timid and perhaps justly cautious party leadership rejected his scheme, he set out on his own political direction, first with a New Party and then with a British Fascist movement on the continental model.

At its height the B.U.F. had probably no

more than 10,000 members. In even the most sympathetic districts of its great stronghold in London's East End B.U.F. candidates for Parliament could not win more than 20 per cent of the vote in their best showing (1937).

Mosley's failure resulted from the resiliency of British institutions and from the shortcomings of British fascism. Cross addresses himself to the latter, paying little attention to the political and social context within which fascism operated. The most important of British fascism's internal weaknesses was its almost suicidal emulation of Italian and German examples. Cross describes how it copied the continental techniques of organization and agitation, the salutes (raised arm), uniforms (blackshirts), symbols (fasces), goon squads (Defence Force), and even ideology (corporatism). When Hitler came to power Mosley began to copy his political anti-Semitism. The B.U.F. even received money from Mussolini—or at least the British public so believed. When Hitler went to war against Great Britain the B.U.F. was doomed.

Mr. Cross has written an interesting and informative story. As a story—but not as an analysis—it is to be recommended. The author gives in to that not uncommon weakness of his fellow English journalists, and not a few scholars, of explaining events and public reactions in terms of poor sportsmanship, a sense of fair play, un-British behavior, rowdyism. Perhaps the graduates of the public schools may conceptualize politics in this fashion, but the failure of the B.U.F. to become a large mass movement has less to do with the upper classes than it does with the sentiments, values and issues of lower and lower middle class areas like the East End.

Herman Lebovics
Brooklyn College

CABINET REFORM IN BRITAIN. 1914-1963. By HANS DAALDER. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 337 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$8.00.)

Professor Daalder holds the first Chair of Political Science at Leiden University in the Netherlands, where the first edition of this study was published in 1960. A careful, detailed account of changing cabinet government in Britain, his book is divided into three sections: an historical survey of the Cabinet since 1914; a detailed account of actual changes in the mechanics of administration, focused on the defense organization and the machinery of the welfare state; and an analysis of suggestions for Cabinet reform. The appendix and index add to the value of this study.

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET. A House in History. By R. J. MINNEY. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963. 433 pages, floor plans, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

“The Prime Minister’s lodgings” provide a focal point for this well-written, colorful British history which focuses on Britain’s prime ministers and weaves into their history the history of the nation. Illustrations, including floor plans of No. 10, enrich this lively study, which makes the house and its succession of famous occupants live again.

BRITISH POLITICAL FACTS 1900-1960. By DAVID BUTLER AND JENNIE FREEMAN. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1963. 220 pages, statistical data, bibliographical note and index, \$9.50.)

This is a miscellany of facts about British government since 1900: ministries, party leaders, members of parliament, and election statistics, plus listings of major social legislation, treaties and international organizations to which Britain belongs. Some population and economic statistics are also included in this compilation of source materials for the student of Britain.

T.H.B.

SOCIALISM IN THE NEW SOCIETY.

By DOUGLAS JAY. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1963. 390 pages and index, \$9.00.)

The author, a Labour member of Parliament, presents a scholarly attempt to reinterpret or “rethink” socialism for contemporary Western democratic society. He gently chides his more doctrinaire colleagues, but presents little that his reader will recognize as peculiarly “Socialist.” Such prescriptions as Keynesian fiscal policy, a gradualist approach to world federalism, and the graduated income tax may have merit, but they hardly seem distinctively Socialist today. The traditional shibboleth, public ownership of the means of production, is almost deprecated.

Jay leaves his reader with a valuable statement of what modern Socialists believe, but not with a statement of Socialist doctrine. Socialists, he maintains, emphasize equality as the basis of social justice, but that, too, is a matter of degree. Apparently, either socialism has incorporated the Western democratic consensus, or vice versa. In either case, British Socialists, along with those of other Western democratic countries, will continue to grope for a set of principles which they can claim as distinctively theirs.

G. W. Thumm
Bates College

WORKS ON EUROPE

THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE. By RICHARD MAYNE. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963. 192 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.00.)

THE NEW EUROPE—TODAY AND TOMORROW. By GEORGE LICHTHEIM. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 232 pages, short reading list and index, \$5.50 [cloth], and \$2.25 [paper].)

The history of the European Community may be said to begin in 1950, with the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. It has continued with the European Economic Community (Com-

mon Market) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom), and it concerns a new economic (and, increasingly, political) unit with a combined population of 170 million, which, as Mayne reminds us, is the world's second largest steel producer, its biggest trading power, its biggest importer, its second biggest exporter, and its biggest buyer of raw materials.

The prehistory of European union goes back much farther than 1950: to the beginnings of the Christian era or even to certain basic physical factors which may, to some extent, determine it. Both of the books under review consider the historical phenomenon with which we are all familiar in the broader context of its past, and both offer us the opportunity to know more about developments which concern us.

Where Mayne presents the making of the European Community in the immediate terms of the best kind of descriptive journalism, Lichtheim describes less the Community than its implications—the vaster and more general issues—in a cultural, historical and economic context. The reader who wants a brief, clear account of precedents, negotiations and achievements, should turn to Richard Mayne. His *Community of Europe* can be read as easily by an intelligent schoolboy as by a curious adult. For a broader discussion, one should look to Lichtheim. He devotes more space (in an altogether more compendious work) to the complex factors affecting British policy and attitudes, and places everything within the framework of present and future world policies.

In a word, where Mayne's book is useful and informative, Lichtheim's is a rich, thought-provoking discussion of important questions, and his *New Europe* might well have been entitled *The New World*. Neither book suffers from having been written before the unfortunate collapse of Britain's bid for admission to the Common Market, though both provide an implicit commentary not only on the failure, but also on certain American illusions concerning both Britain and Europe. In either

case, the reader should expect to meet friends of the European Community; and if I myself find both books excellent and both objective, this may well be due to my essential agreement with the views of both.

Eugen Weber
University of California, Los Angeles

THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY, 1914–1945. By LIONEL KOCHAN. (Edinburgh and Chicago: Edinburgh University Press and Aldine Publishing Co., 1963. 150 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$3.95.)

REUNIFICATION AND WEST GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. By WERNER FELD. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. 204 pages, bibliography and index, 18 guilders.)

So many niggling, superficial or prejudiced books are published by and about Germany and Germans that an essay like Dr. Kochan's must be welcomed with relief as well as admiration. In 96 pages of dense but lucid narrative, backed by half as many pages of notes, the Lecturer in History at Edinburgh University tells the story of Russian and Western efforts over the last half century to secure allegiance or control of Germany. He shows how Germany exploited Western fears of "any subversive onslaught that may come from the East" (Baldwin), how Communist diplomacy exploited the contradictions of the capitalist world (Lenin), and how consistently the Westerners treated Germany—Nazi or not—as a bulwark against Bolshevism (Lord Halifax), thinking that fascism would do their dirty work for them. In the end, the great debatable land of central Europe would be divided between the contenders for its favors, neither of whom could secure it whole. The 30-year contest was resolved by partition; and one might wish the matter were settled at last, a chapter of history closed with this very good book—learned, objective and concise—which no student of modern history should miss.

Yet, as we know, the chapter is by no means closed. A continuation of the sub-

ject may be found in Werner Feld's study of the reunification issue in West German foreign policy since the war. Professor Feld concludes that while reunification was proclaimed as Bonn's supreme foreign policy goal, it was never allowed to interfere with the pursuit of other objectives which seem to run counter to its achievement. In particular, while good relations with Russia are indispensable to reunification, these have been subordinated consistently to closer integration with the Western powers and the strengthening of the *Bundesrepublik's* own economy. There may be some point in substantiating this apparent commonplace, but one wonders if it could not have been done with less jargon and more imagination. Mr. Kochan's essay suggests that it could.

Eugen Weber
University of California, Los Angeles

UNITED EUROPE: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY. By WALTER HALLSTEIN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 92 pages, bibliography and index. \$2.75.)

Books created by compiling public lectures are normally good, but rarely significant. This collection of Dr. Walter Hallstein's 1962 Clayton Lectures at Tufts University is an illustration. It is a *good* book; its author could hardly write a poor one. Sound, clear, logical and succinct, it affords an excellent brief introduction to the "Europe of the Six." It is not a *significant* book. It provides neither otherwise unavailable information on the development and functioning of "United Europe" nor a searching critical analysis of the problems and prospects. Rather, the information contained is already known to the scholar and readily available to the layman, and the critique is hardly more penetrating than that usually provided by a public relations office.

This book is a good survey for the beginner, but the educated layman who wants to study the topic will want far more information for his research. G. W. T.

RUSSIANS THEN AND NOW: A SELECTION OF RUSSIAN WRITING FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO OUR OWN DAY. EDITED BY AVRAHM YARMOLINSKY. (New York: Macmillan, 1963. 455 pages, \$8.50.)

Both Yarmolinsky and his wife, Babette Deutsch, have spent many decades selecting, translating, and editing literary collections ". . . of Russians, by Russians, if not for Russians." *Russians: Then and Now* is another anthology of highlights from Russian literature. It is arranged "before" and "after," i.e., chronologically in two parts divided by the Revolution and beginning with three folk tales about the sixteenth century Czar, Ivan the Terrible.

The central criterion for the difficult task of selection seems to be people, places and preoccupations in poetry and prose. Why some writers are "in" and some are "out" is irrelevant; the intellectual curiosity of the reader is stimulated by this "literary sample-case," even though it would not be difficult to question the inclusion of certain excerpts when English translations of the complete works are well-known and readily available, e.g., "Haying" from Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*.

Rather uneven notes accompany the prose selections from Avvakum, Klyuchevsky, Lomonosov, Aksakov, Radishev, Herzen, Gogol, Goncharov, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Leskov, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Bunin, and Gorky in part I; Babel, Zamyatin, Trotsky, Zoshchenko, Olesha, Sholokhov, Koltsov, Agapov, Grossman, N. Zhdanov, Nagibin, Pasternak, V. Nekrasov, Kazakov, and Melnikov in part II, and the poetic excerpts from Pushkin. Other poets included are Derzhavin, Lermontov, Tyutchev, N. Nekrasov, Belyi, Blok, Bunin, Mandelstamm, Voloshin and Yesenin in part I; Yesenin, Khodasevich, Akhmatova, Mayakovsky, Orlov, Dolmatovsky, Tvardovsky, Tatyachicheva, Pasternak, Slutsky, Yevtushenko and Kochetkov.

Anna Pirschenok
University of Pennsylvania
(Continued on page 308)

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Johnson-Home Communiqué

At the conclusion of discussions in February, 1964, between United States President Lyndon Johnson and British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the following communiqué was made public:

On February 12 and 13, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom met to discuss matters affecting the interests of their two countries and the welfare and security of free people everywhere. The United States Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk, and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, the Right Honorable R. A. Butler, also took part in the talks.

President Johnson and Sir Alec Douglas-Home welcomed this opportunity of holding their first working meeting since they assumed the leadership of their respective Governments. Underlying their talks was the determination that the pursuit of peace should be unfalteringly maintained.

They consider this pursuit of peace with security, in cooperation with their allies, their primary task and responsibility. The conclusion of the partial test ban treaty in 1963 marked an advance on the road to the peaceful resolution of the problems which divide East and West. The President and the Prime Minister think it essential to go forward from there and continue with their friends the search for other ways of reducing tension, with its risks of war and its crushing burden of armaments.

They hope that the Soviet Union will examine with the greatest seriousness the proposals put forward at the Geneva conference and elsewhere by the United States and the United Kingdom, aimed at bringing about effective and controlled disarmament. In

particular, the Prime Minister welcomed the proposals made to the 18-nation disarmament conference by the United States in President Johnson's message on January 21.

Both Governments will continue to give their full support to the United Nations and will work in close step to enable it by statesmanship and institutional improvement to fulfill its responsibility and satisfy the hopes of mankind.

But each Government recognizes that no progress can be made without a strong and united Western alliance prepared to defend its interests against threat and intimidation. The defense commitments which both countries share with their allies in Nato will be maintained. It is within the Atlantic framework that the United States and the United Kingdom are conducting their examination of mutual defense problems, including force goals, and are also considering the proposals for a multilateral nuclear force. Similarly, the widest possible political and economic co-operation in Europe within a broad Atlantic partnership remains a common aim of United States and British policy.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the events of recent months, during which sudden tensions in many parts of the world have made unforeseen calls on the resources of the United States and the United Kingdom. The two Governments are responding to these calls whilst at the same time taking all political action that is open to them to diminish the causes of tension. Each Gov-

ernment recognizes the value of the contribution that the other is making to the common task.

The Prime Minister and the President gave special consideration to Southeast Asian matters and to the problem of assisting free states of the area to maintain their independence. Both Governments stressed the value of the defense agreements which they have concluded there, and of the establishments which they maintain in the area. The Prime Minister re-emphasized the United Kingdom support for United States policy in South Vietnam. The President reaffirmed the support of the United States for the peaceful national independence of Malaysia. Both expressed their sincere hope that the leaders of the independent countries in the region would by mutual friendship and cooperation establish an area of prosperity and stability.

The President stressed his concern at the present situation in the Caribbean area and the subversive and disruptive influence of the present Cuban regime. The Prime Minister

fully recognized the importance of the development of Latin America in conditions of freedom and political and economic stability. Both expressed their belief that a valuable contribution can be made by Europe to this end.

Both Governments reaffirm that in all these fields their aim remains solely to achieve and safeguard the integrity and stability of the countries of the free world on the basis of full independence. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the task is, however, not only that of establishing and preserving the peace, but of expanding international trade and promoting economic growth for all. To this end, both pledged their Governments to act affirmatively and decisively to promote the success of the forthcoming Kennedy round of trade and tariff negotiations.

In view of the importance that both the President and the Prime Minister attach to such meetings, they have determined to continue to maintain close and continuous personal contact.


Security Council Resolution On Cyprus

On March 4, 1964, after considerable debate, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a resolution on Cyprus. The resolution recommended the creation of an international peace-keeping force in Cyprus and the designation of a mediator to operate under the auspices of the United Nations. After hearing reports from representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, the Security Council, on March 13, 1964, adopted a second resolution reaffirming the March 4 resolution, and calling on all Member States "to co-operate." The complete text of the March 4, 1964, Security Council resolution follows:

The Security Council, noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,"



Reprinted from *The Economist*, London, March 7, 1964. Used by Permission.

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;

2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander of the force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. Recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting

and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6. Recommends that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

THE COMMONWEALTH

(Continued from page 262)

conomic revival of Western Europe in the 1950's contains lessons and opportunities for her which she will neglect at her peril.

She continues to take pride in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth, however, no longer receives the almost undivided attention of Britain's rulers. In the past, the priority accorded to Commonwealth matters sometimes led to an ignorance of European developments that was perilous to Britain. The appeasers of the 1930's were in many cases men who cared much for the Commonwealth but were amazingly ignorant of Europe; a stricture, however, which certainly did not apply to one of the greatest advocates of Commonwealth cooperation, L. S. Amery. In the 1950's, a paralyzing fear of jeopardizing the Commonwealth connection caused Britain's failure to participate in the Coal and Steel Community, and later in the Common Market.

There is much to be lost, and little to be gained, by preferring Commonwealth orientations of policy to European, especially if, as seems to be the case, the growing nationalism of Commonwealth countries renders it impossible to strengthen the economic links between these nations and Britain. A nation must, in the long run, follow its own vital interests.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

(Continued from page 281)

Britain's nuclear deterrent. The London *Economist*, often considerably ahead of events, presented Britain's nuclear alternatives in March, 1963, listing them somewhat crudely as follows: "To get out of this damned business altogether . . . to keep its own separate nuclear force, shiny, bright, and free of grubby foreign fingers . . . (or) to invest Britain's nuclear force in what one hopes will become a joint nuclear defense effort by Europe and America." It was not much of

¹⁶ See *The Economist*, March 23, 1963, p. 1086-87.

a contest; true there were certain doubts, but as *The Economist* concluded:

If these doubts can be resolved, the right policy for Britain is pretty clearly to screw up its eyes, pinch its nose, and take the plunge into a jointly-manned, jointly-owned allied nuclear force, discarding its independent water-wings on the way.¹⁶

But all of this leads to a new and different set of imponderables: the choices to be made and the roles to be played by West Germany. In the short run, at least, Anglo-American relations may well be most realistically viewed as a function of West German policy and the developing pattern of its relations—not only in Europe, but with Britain and the United States, and above all in the North Atlantic community.

POLITICS IN BRITAIN

(Continued from page 286)

both for the shaping of policy and for its administration.

Yet amid all this malaise there are signs that a new Britain is coming to birth. Great decisions are being taken—the application for admission to the European Economic Community (temporarily unsuccessful though it has been), the adoption of a decimal coinage, the agreement to construct a Channel tunnel, the program for expansion of education, the beginning of scientific economic planning. These steps are signs of an underlying vitality that augurs well for the future of Britain, no matter what party is in office.

ROOTS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

(Continued from page 299)

ized that the conditions under which Britain had been able to pursue its policy were changing. New means were necessary. At the turn of the century, Lansdowne pleaded with his countrymen to relinquish "musty formulas and old-fashioned superstitions." Yet, the ends were the same, and statesmen remained the prisoners of the past. Two world wars and the threat of a third only emphasized their inadequacy.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE

(Continued from page 268)

of non-specialised industries does not seriously reduce the scope for total sales by advanced countries; protection of a broad regional market, whose size facilitates the development of a wider range of industries, could reduce, relatively speaking, the area of world trade in a way particularly unfavourable to Britain. The more and more effectively protectionist the rest of the world is, the more will Britain be driven to seek its markets in Europe. And if Europe itself is protectionist, then, willy-nilly Britain in the long run will have to seek closer association or resign itself to the position of a relatively poor, increasingly backward, offshore island.

THE BRITISH ECONOMY

(Continued from page 295)

of supporting policies necessitated by redundancy, even when they are designed expressly to remove its sting; and craft groups are often unwilling to countenance policies to extend their privileges more widely.

The government's own role in the process of industrial modernisation is not unequivocal. It has belatedly embraced the concept of more fundamental economic planning for sustained growth; but often seems not to have acknowledged some of its sterner practical implications. Much of its effort has appeared piece-meal and dictated by events: the railways rationalisation plan is not linked to any national transport policy; the relative decline of the old industries has often been allowed to proceed haphazardly—before adequate provision for displaced labour has been made—sometimes necessitating the illogical provision of public funds as a short-term prop; regional policy has so far consisted of efforts to reinvigorate declining areas without detailed reference to national balance and comparative costs. It is doubtful whether the official lead in such fields as the application of technological advance in industry is sufficiently strong and direct. Moreover, the social reform nec-

essary to complement economic change is frequently inadequate.

While the root cause of the present government's shortcomings in economic modernisation might lie in a basic incompatibility between Conservative party philosophy and the rather more *dirigiste* measures necessary if progress is really to be rapid, a Labour government, too, might find its ability to quicken the pace impaired by its own sacred cows.

A final important reason for expecting progress to remain slower than one would like is that a real solution to Britain's external problems probably depends more on the reform of the whole international monetary system than on the internal measures that might be taken to boost exports and reduce out-payments.

But at least top priority for the search for means to promote sustained growth now looks irreversible. The spread of automation is also potentially a great boon to Britain, with its slowly growing labour force and its traditions of technical skill; but the movement must be harnessed and the ground prepared. The modernisation and structural reform of the economy is a great challenge.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 303)

REFORM AND REACTION. By JOSE M. SANCHEZ. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963. 218 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

This book provides an excellent and much needed coverage of the politico-religious background of the Spanish Civil War. The author is to be commended for being comprehensive without straying dangerously from his topic; remaining clear and concise while dealing with an era of great complexity. Jonathan Bayer

University of Pennsylvania

ERRATUM: The review of *Burma's Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism* on page 242 of our April issue was written by ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of March, 1964, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Asian-African People's Solidarity Conference

Mar. 27—A 6-day conference in Algeria ends.

Disarmament

Mar. 2—In an interview in *Izvestia* (Soviet government newspaper) Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko accuses the Western powers of blocking progress on a disarmament plan. He states that only the Soviet plan provides a realistic disarmament program.

Mar. 3—The Soviet delegate to the Geneva disarmament conference declares that the U.S.S.R. will continue to participate in the talks.

Mar. 5—The U.S. delegate, Adrian S. Fisher, tells the 17-nation Geneva disarmament conference that the U.S. will permit international inspection of one of its largest nuclear reactors at Rowe, Massachusetts. He appeals to the Soviet Union to follow the U.S. example.

Mar. 17—The U.S. lists 4 objections to the Soviet disarmament proposal. The Russians suggest that, in the beginning stages of such an agreement, almost all missiles should be destroyed.

Mar. 19—At the Geneva talks, the U.S. offers to destroy 480 B-47 bombers if the Soviet Union will scrap an equal number of its TU-16 bombers.

Mar. 24—India calls on the U.S. to accept "in principle" the Soviet proposal that most weapons be destroyed during the first stage of a disarmament program.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Mar. 3—The agricultural ministers of France

and West Germany agree to postpone the establishment of grain price uniformity in 1964; under the Mansholt plan submitted in November, 1963, the 6 E.E.C. members were to introduce uniform prices on grain in one step in 1964.

Mar. 6—Three members of the E.E.C. executive commission confer in Washington with U.S. officials on the forthcoming Gatt negotiations on tariff disparities.

Latin America

Mar. 6—The 18 Latin American nations meeting in Argentina conclude a 2-week conference. A declaration outlines Latin America's proposals for world trade and aid in preparation for the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development.

Organization of African Unity

Mar. 1—The African foreign ministers attending the O.A.U. meeting in Nigeria approve more than 20 resolutions to be considered by an African heads-of-state conference scheduled for the summer.

United Nations

(See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus*)

Mar. 21—A Soviet statement issued by the Soviet delegation to the U.N. warns against attempts to force it to pay for the U.N. peace force in the Congo and in the Middle East. The statement warns that attempts to invoke Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, depriving a member of voting rights if it falls 2 years behind in its contributions, will be considered an "unfriendly act."

Mar. 23—At the opening of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, a message by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev is read; he accuses the im-

perialist countries of repressing the underdeveloped countries. The session opens with an address by Secretary-General U Thant.

Mar. 24—France submits a plan, at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, to assist the underdeveloped nations; the plan calls for increased trade and higher prices. Mar. 26—The Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade tells the U.N. Trade Conference that his country is willing to assist underdeveloped countries; he also asks for increased trade with the Soviet Union.

ALGERIA

Mar. 13—A communiqué issued by French President Charles de Gaulle's office declares that de Gaulle met secretly today with Algerian President Ben Bella outside of Paris. Ben Bella is en route home from a 7-day official visit to Yugoslavia.

BRAZIL

Mar. 13—President João Goulart signs 2 decrees providing for the expropriation of 1,250 acres of land adjacent to federal highways, railways and reservoirs, and some private oil refineries.

Mar. 15—In the President's annual message to Congress, Goulart requests constitutional amendments to permit the Government to award compensation for expropriated lands in bonds rather than in cash and to allow illiterate persons to vote.

Mar. 26—It is reported that last night some 3,000 sailors and marines rebelled and seized the Metallurgical Workers Union; the rebels demand reforms and support Goulart's reform drive.

Mar. 27—The mutinous rebels surrender and are released under an amnesty.

Mar. 29—Goulart arrives in Rio de Janeiro to consult with navy officers who have accused the Government of not disciplining the Sailors and Marines Association.

Mar. 30—Goulart orders an investigation of the amnesty granted the mutineers and of the officers who demanded discipline.

Mar. 31—An army revolt headed by the re-

gional military commander, General Olimpio Mourão, begins in Juiz de Fora. Strikes are called; communications with Brasilia are severed; banks are closed.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE Canada

Mar. 26—In a White Paper, the Minister of National Defense tells Parliament of plans to bring the three branches of the armed services under one supreme chief.

Cyprus

Mar. 4—The U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution to set up a peace-keeping force in Cyprus; a mediator will report to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant who will in turn report to the Security Council. U Thant begins negotiations on organizing the peace force.

Mar. 9—Greek and Turkish Cypriotes battle in Paphos, where heavy fighting creates an "extremely grave" situation. Fighting erupted in December, 1963, when Turkish Cypriotes interpreted Greek attempts to amend the Cypriote constitution as a threat to Turkish minority rights.

Mar. 11—Reliable sources report that the U.S. and Britain together will donate half of the \$6 million necessary to maintain a U.N. peace force in Cyprus for 3 months.

Mar. 13—U Thant tells an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council that an advance group of Canadian officers is on its way to Cyprus and that Ireland, Sweden and Canada have agreed to send troops as part of a U.N. peace-keeping operation.

The Turkish government announces that it will donate \$100,000 to defray the costs of the Cyprus peace force. Earlier, Turkey dispatched a note to Cypriote President Makarios warning that Turkey would come to the defense of Turk Cypriotes if fighting continued.

Greece announces that it will donate \$500,000 toward the U.N. peace force.

Mar. 25—U Thant names the Finnish Ambassador to Sweden, Sakari S. Tuomioja, to serve as the U.N. mediator in Cyprus.

Mar. 27—U.N. troops begin their peace-keep-

ing operation in Cyprus under Lieutenant General Prem Singh Gyani.

Ghana

Mar. 11—President Kwame Nkrumah presents to Parliament a 7-year development plan costing \$2.85 billion.

Great Britain

Mar. 2—In Washington, British Labor party leader Harold Wilson ends 3 days of talks with U.S. officials, including President Lyndon Johnson.

Mar. 10—Queen Elizabeth II gives birth to her fourth child and third son.

Mar. 16—Sir Harold Caccia is named to head the new diplomatic service that will unify the work of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office.

Mar. 23—In a White Paper presented to the Parliament, the British government announces an experimental plan for government compensation to victims of crimes of violence, provided there is an "appreciable degree of injury."

India

Mar. 1—Prime Minister Ohulam Mohammed Sadiq of Kashmir declares that he will seek to integrate Kashmir with "the rest of India."

Mar. 19—Violent fighting erupts between Muslims and Hindus in Raigarh. The city is placed under curfew following the deaths of 7 Muslims.

Mar. 21—The Government announces that army forces are being sent to Eastern India where Hindu-Muslim religious fighting has taken many lives. It is reported that fighting in Jamshedpur is continuing into its third day; so far some 51 persons have been killed.

Malaysia, Federation of

Mar. 3—A Malaysian spokesman declares that his Government is waiting for an answer to its demand that Indonesian guerrillas withdraw from Malaysian territory. In Thailand, Malaysian, Indonesian, Phil-

ippine and Thai officials confer on the conflict over Malaysia.

Mar. 4—The 4-power conference meeting in Thailand is deadlocked over the cease-fire arrangements. Malaysia has demanded that the recall of Indonesian rebels from Malaysian soil precede further negotiation; Indonesia has refused. Malaysian Prince Abdul Rahman announces that he will ask the U.N. to discuss the crisis. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak charges that Indonesia has violated the cease-fire agreement of January, 1964.

Nigeria

Mar. 18—British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home flies to Nigeria for talks.

Pakistan

Mar. 1—In a radio broadcast, Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan speculates about the possibility of a Chinese attack against India. Ayub Khan states that if such an event were to occur, India's position would be much stronger if she were on friendly terms with Pakistan.

Zanzibar

Mar. 2—President Abeid Amani Karume and the Revolutionary Council approve 7 decrees, one of which provides for the arbitrary detention of any person threatening to upset law and order.

Mar. 8—It is reported that the revolutionary Government has ordered the nationalization of all farms and clove plantations. Certain private buildings and private clubs are also nationalized.

BRITISH DEPENDENCIES

Malta

Mar. 15—In a joint statement issued by Nationalist party leader George Borg and British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys, it is announced that a referendum will be held on a constitution for Malta. Maltese independence is scheduled for May 31, 1964.

BURMA

Mar. 28—The Revolutionary Council bans all political parties except the Burma Socialist Program party. The assets of the other parties are seized.

CAMBODIA

Mar. 9—Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in a radio broadcast, accuses the U.S. of blocking his efforts to convene an international or 4-power conference to guarantee neutral status for Cambodia. The Prince threatens to hold border negotiations with North Vietnam and the pro-Communist Pathet Lao in Laos.

Mar. 10—Lieutenant General Lon Nol, Commander-in-chief, heads a delegation to Peking and Moscow to negotiate arms sales.

The U.S. State Department declares that the U.S. has supported a neutrality conference.

Mar. 11—Cambodians attack the U.S. and British embassies, and information offices in a 3-hour demonstration. Prince Norodom Sihanouk offers his regrets and announces that he is withdrawing his demand for a 4-power conference to guarantee Cambodia's borders.

Mar. 15—A shipment of military aid from Communist China arrives in Cambodia.

Mar. 21—The U.S. and South Vietnam express their regrets for an attack on the Cambodian border village of Chantrea on March 19 by Vietnamese forces supported by the U.S.

Mar. 22—Prince Sihanouk states that expressions of regrets are not enough to save the Vietnamese-Cambodian border negotiations. In a note of protest to the U.S. Embassy, Cambodia demands compensation for damages.

Mar. 23—Border talks between Cambodia and South Vietnam are formally adjourned. A joint communiqué is issued declaring that conditions are unfavorable for continuing the talks. Sihanouk reiterates his demand for an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's borders and neutrality.

Mar. 24—The British government rejects a

Soviet request that their 2 nations call an international conference on Cambodian neutrality; Britain and the U.S.S.R. were cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina.

Mar. 25—In a letter to Prince Sihanouk made public today, French President de Gaulle promises to use his influence with Britain and the U.S. to effect the calling of a multi-nation conference.

Mar. 26—It is reported that Cambodia has sent a letter to the U.S. Embassy demanding payment for damages resulting from the attack on Chantrea and other villages; the Cambodian government demands one tractor or bulldozer for each person killed.

Mar. 27—The Cambodian government announces that it will not resume negotiations with South Vietnam until Britain and the U.S.S.R. schedule a conference on Cambodian neutrality.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Mar. 1—Premier Chou En-lai returns from a tour of Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon.

Mar. 11—*Hsinhua* (Communist Chinese press agency) reports that a top-ranking Rumanian delegation led by Premier Ion G. Maurer conferred in Peking from March 3 to March 10. On the agenda was the question of Sino-Soviet ideological differences.

Mar. 31—*Hsinhua* broadcasts the text of a Red Chinese statement urging Communist parties to throw off Soviet leadership. The Chinese describe Premier Khrushchev as the "greatest capitulationist in history."

COLOMBIA

Mar. 15—Colombian voters cast ballots for members of the House of Representatives and municipal and departmental assemblies.

Mar. 17—Incomplete returns reveal that the National Front coalition, composed of the Conservative and Liberal groups, has won 68 per cent of the vote, retaining a two-thirds majority in the Congress.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Mar. 1—In a radio broadcast, President Joseph Kasavubu announces the suspension of the Parliament; since Parliament's term is due to expire June 30, the suspension amounts to dissolution.

Mar. 17—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, in a written report to the Security Council, states that he has been informed that some 1,800 former Katanganese gendarmes are being trained in Angola.

Mar. 20—Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and Premier Cyrille Adoula announce agreement on financial problems and other matters pending since Congolese independence was granted in 1960.

Mar. 26—U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman confers in Leopoldville with Adoula.

CUBA

Mar. 26—Premier Fidel Castro testifies at the second trial of Marcos Rodriguez Alfonso, convicted of being an informer for ex-President Fulgencio Batista. Rodriguez belonged to the "old guard" Communist party.

Mar. 27—Continuing testimony to the Supreme Court at Rodriguez' trial, broadcast and televised throughout Cuba, Castro speaks for almost 5 hours. He condemns sectarianism and "divisive forces" within the Cuban Communist party.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mar. 21—U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic William T. Bennett Jr. arrives to take up his duties; diplomatic relations have been suspended since September, 1963.

EL SALVADOR

Mar. 18—Results of the March 8 legislative assembly and municipal elections are announced. Considered a victory for freer elections in El Salvador, the major opposition party, the Christian Democrats, wins 14 assembly seats and the mayoralty of San Salvador. The pro-Government National Conciliation party keeps 32 of the 54 seats.

ETHIOPIA

Mar. 26—Fighting on the Ethiopian-Somali border is renewed. In the Sudan, delegates from the 2 countries are conferring on a settlement of the border fight.

Mar. 30—A joint communiqué is issued by Ethiopia and Somalia announcing a cease-fire agreement effective April 1.

FRANCE

Mar. 15—De Gaulle departs for a 10-day trip to Mexico and French territories in the Western Hemisphere.

Mar. 16—De Gaulle receives a cheering welcome in a parade in Mexico City. De Gaulle tells a crowd of 225,000 that Mexico and France should "walk hand in hand."

Mar. 20—Speaking in Guadeloupe, de Gaulle states that other countries will have to try to "adapt themselves" to French independence in foreign policy matters.

Mar. 24—De Gaulle returns to Paris.

Mar. 28—Sources report that the development of France's independent nuclear force has been slowed by production difficulties.

GABON

Mar. 3—Anti-government demonstrations continue for the third day.

Mar. 9—A bomb is exploded outside the U.S. Embassy and the building is fired on.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Mar. 2—West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard arrives in the Netherlands for talks with Dutch leaders.

GERMANY, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (East)

Mar. 13—A Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, leaves after a 3-day visit to Germany. It is reported that a joint communiqué has been issued, voicing East German support for the U.S.S.R in its conflict with Communist China.

GREECE

Mar. 6—King Paul of the Hellènes dies from

complications following surgery last month. Crown Prince Constantine is proclaimed king.

GUINEA

Mar. 27—President Sékou Touré ends a 3-day visit to West Germany where he met with West German President Heinrich Lübke.

INDONESIA

(See also *British Commonwealth, Malaysia*)

Mar. 15—*Antara* (official press agency) reports that Malaysian forces have staged an attack on an Indonesian army post near the border.

Mar. 25—President Sukarno declares that his country "can do without aid." His statement follows yesterday's remark by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that U.S. aid will be discontinued until the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute has been settled.

IRAN

Mar. 7—Premier Assadollah Alam resigns; his successor, Hassan Ali Mansur, is immediately appointed by Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi. Mansur names his cabinet.

IRAQ

Mar. 11—Kurdish leader General Mustafa al-Barzani confers with Iranian officials on transforming the cease-fire agreement of last month into a permanent peace settlement.

ITALY

Mar. 14—A billion dollar credit for Italy, to offset a deficit in her balance of payments, is agreed on by the U.S. and several European banks.

JAPAN

Mar. 24—The U. S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, is stabbed in the leg by a reportedly deranged young Japanese.

Mar. 25—In a live telecast to the U.S. via a communications satellite, Premier Hayato Ikeda expresses his regrets for the stabbing of Reischauer.

KOREA, SOUTH

Mar. 26—Demonstrations by students continue in Seoul and other cities for the third day; they are protesting negotiations underway in Tokyo to "normalize" Japanese-Korean relations.

Mar. 28—It is reported that President Chung Hee Park has recalled Colonel Kim Chong Pil from the Tokyo talks.

Mar. 30—President Park tells student representatives that Korea will continue to try to normalize relations with Japan.

LAOS

Mar. 16—Representatives of the neutralist, rightist and pro-Communist factions in Laos agree to halt "all military activities" in the Plaine des Jarres. The representatives of the 3 warring parties are discussing security measures for a meeting among their leaders.

LIBYA

Mar. 16—The Chamber of Deputies, by unanimous vote, orders the government to negotiate the liquidation of British and U.S. bases on Libyan soil.

Mar. 21—A Government statement is broadcast announcing that King Idris I has reversed his decision to abdicate, following public demonstrations of loyalty and appeals by government leaders.

LUXEMBOURG

Mar. 25—Premier Pierre Werner reads a letter from Grand Duchess Charlotte announcing that she will abdicate in favor of her son in November.

MEXICO

(See also *France*)

Mar. 18—In a joint communiqué, French President Charles de Gaulle and President Adolfo López Mateos agree to promote closer French-Mexican trade relations and cultural ties.

PANAMA

Mar. 12—"Qualified diplomatic officials" in Washington report that Panama and the

U.S. have accepted the 5-nation O.A.S. subcommittee formula for settling their differences. It is reported that announcement of the accord has been delayed pending U.S.-Panamanian attempts to coordinate statements announcing the agreement.

Mar. 15—Without the formal support of the U.S. and Panama, the subcommittee urges the 2 nations to comply immediately with the terms of the formula as accepted on March 12. The chairman of the 5-nation mediation team announces the terms of the agreement.

Mar. 16—U.S. President Johnson states that there has been no meeting of minds between Panamanian President Roberto Chiari and himself on settling their differences.

Mar. 17—It is reported that the 5-nation subcommittee has ended efforts to mediate the U.S.-Panamanian dispute.

Mar. 21—President Johnson makes public a statement sent to the chairman of the Council of the O.A.S. in which he expresses U.S. willingness to "review every issue" pertaining to the U.S.-Panamanian rift.

RUMANIA

Mar. 2—A delegation from Rumania, headed by Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, arrives in Communist China for talks, allegedly to mediate the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Mar. 16—The Rumanian Communist delegation meets with Premier Nikita Khrushchev for the second day in Gagry on the Black Sea to report on its talks with Red Chinese leaders.

SAUDI ARABIA

Mar. 22—A council of religious leaders convenes to discuss King Saud's demand that full power of sovereignty be restored to him. While in poor health, King Saud gave his powers to Crown Prince Faisal, his half-brother.

Mar. 28—King Saud signs a decree giving Prince Faisal full powers and reducing his own role to that of a figurehead. King Saud yields his personal guard, most of his

revenue and half his income.

Mar. 31—It is reported that Crown Prince Faisal has issued a decree giving himself all powers "enjoyed by the King"; he takes the title of Viceroy. Faisal orders into exile the 7 sons of King Saud.

SOMALIA

(See also *Ethiopia*)

Mar. 30—Parliamentary elections are held.

TOGO

Mar. 4—President Nicolas Grunitzky, on a state visit to France, is welcomed by de Gaulle.

TURKEY

(See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus*)

U.S.S.R., THE

Mar. 2—*Pravda* (Communist party newspaper) publishes a program adopted by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to promote anti-religious thinking; atheist action groups will be established in cities having religious communities. An Institute of Scientific Atheism will also be set up.

Mar. 10—A Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, arrives in Berlin for talks with East German officials. The Soviet Union, in a note to the U.S., charges that the U.S. Air Force jet plane shot down over East Germany last week was engaged in espionage. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Mar. 29—Khrushchev departs for Hungary to attend the 19th anniversary celebration of the liberation from German occupation.

Mar. 31—In Budapest, Khrushchev opens talks with Hungarian leaders.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Mar. 10—Elections for the National Assembly's 350 seats are held. Parliament has been dissolved since September, 1961. Only members of Nasser's Arab Socialist Union party are eligible to run.

Mar. 23—President Gamal Abdel Nasser submits a draft constitution to serve until the new Parliament can adopt a permanent charter. The draft constitution calls for

a national plebiscite to elect a president in March, 1965.

Mar. 24—Nasser names Field Marshal Abd-el Hakim Amer as first vice-president, a new post.

Mar. 26—Nasser addresses the new National Assembly.

UNITED STATES

Economy

Mar. 7—In a televised news conference, President Lyndon B. Johnson tells of the improved domestic economic situation and predicts increased business investment.

Foreign Policy

Mar. 7—At a news conference, President Johnson clarifies the U.S. position on American troop withdrawal from Vietnam: troops will be withdrawn when they have completed a particular mission, but if needed, additional forces will be sent to Vietnam. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Mar. 10—The Air Force announces that a U.S. reconnaissance jet-bomber has been shot down after it strayed into East Germany. The fate of the 3 airmen aboard is not known.

Mar. 12—The U.S. State Department denies Soviet charges that the reconnaissance bomber was spying; a spokesman for the State Department declares that the plane was on a training mission. It is reported that witnesses in East Germany have stated that the 3 airmen parachuted safely.

Mar. 15—In a radio-television broadcast reviewing his 120 days in office, Johnson outlines his foreign policy goals.

Mar. 19—Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. that the downed reconnaissance plane accidentally strayed into East German air space; he warns against inflating the episode into a major crisis. Rusk demands that the 3 U.S. airmen be released.

Mar. 21—The Soviet Union releases the injured one of the 3 U.S. airmen shot down 11 days ago. The fate of the other 2 airmen is not yet known.

Mar. 25—In a Senate speech, Arkansas Senator J. W. Fulbright urges that the U.S. adapt its foreign policy to meet the challenges of "a complex and rapidly changing world."

Mar. 26—In a speech planned with Rusk and Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara outlines U.S. goals in Vietnam: to support Vietnam independence and prevent a Communist take-over. McNamara rejects neutralization as opening the door to communism.

Mar. 27—The second and third of the U.S. Air Force officers (shot down March 10) are delivered into U.S. hands in West Germany.

Mar. 31—A U.S. Air Force spokesman declares that training flights in a 70-mile zone along the East-West German border have been prohibited.

Government

Mar. 1—It is reported that an assistant federal prosecutor in New York has admitted that he ordered a Justice Department check on Roy M. Cohn's mail. Cohn is being charged with perjury and conspiracy. (Cohn served as chief counsel to the Senate investigating subcommittee when it was under the leadership of the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.)

Mar. 4—President Johnson announces the appointments of 10 women to top government jobs to end a "stag government." The House approves an authorization of \$115 million for the Peace Corps, for the fiscal year beginning July 1. The Senate has already passed the bill.

Mar. 7—President Johnson appoints Hugh Owens to serve as a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission and James L. Robertson to serve on the Federal Reserve Board. Johnson states his intention to reappoint James K. Walrath to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mar. 8—It is reported that Assistant Secretary of Defense Steuart L. Pittman has resigned; he was in charge of the civil defense program.

Mar. 9—In a report to Congress on the na-

tion's manpower problems, President Johnson requests that a 14-man commission be established to deal with employment and technological change.

Mar. 12—Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy, in his first public statement on the subject, denies reports of a feud with President Johnson.

Mar. 13—President Johnson flies over the Ohio River Valley from Pennsylvania to Mississippi to examine flood-devastated areas in 5 states. He promises federal aid for the area.

An affidavit is introduced at an executive session of the Senate Rules Committee investigating the affairs of Robert G. Baker, former secretary to the Democratic majority in the Senate. The affidavit contains charges by Baker's tax accountant in 1961 and 1962, Milton L. Hauft, that his signature was forged on some of Baker's tax returns. Termination of the Baker inquiry is postponed.

A 3-judge federal court decides that Alabama must redistrict for congressional elections after 1964.

Mar. 14—A Dallas, Texas, jury finds Jack L. Ruby "guilty of murder with malice"; under Texas law, the death sentence is now mandatory. Ruby shot Lee H. Oswald, accused of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Mar. 15—In a television interview, Johnson declares that the 2 major goals of his domestic program are the enactment of the civil rights bill and the war against poverty.

Mar. 16—In a special message to Congress, Johnson submits his one billion dollar program for the war against poverty. The program is designed to provide retraining and education for young persons; assistance for rural families; and a domestic peace corps. Local campaigns against poverty are to be stimulated by federal assistance. A coordinating Office of Economic Opportunity, headed by Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver, is to be established.

Mar. 19—White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger resigns. Associate Press Secretary Andrew T. Hatcher also resigns. Presi-

dent Johnson appoints George E. Reedy as press secretary.

Johnson sends a message to Congress requesting a \$3.4 billion foreign aid appropriation (\$2.4 billion in economic aid and \$1 billion in military assistance) for the fiscal year beginning July 1.

Mar. 20—President Johnson signs a bill providing \$16.9 billion for military expenditures for planes, ships, missiles and research; the bill also authorizes \$52 million for a manned bomber plane, a project opposed by the President.

Johnson announces that Mrs. Katharine Elkus White will be named Ambassador to Denmark.

Mar. 21—A 3-judge federal court finds that congressional districting in Maryland is unconstitutional.

Mar. 23—It is reported that William McCormick Blair, Ambassador to Denmark, will be appointed U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines.

Mar. 24—Roy M. Cohn goes on trial for perjury.

Mar. 25—The Senate Rules Committee hears testimony by Milton Hauft on Bobby Baker's forged tax returns. It is reported that today's meeting is the last public session in the Baker inquiry; the chairman of the committee adjourns the session without scheduling another meeting.

Mar. 27—A 3-member panel of federal judges rules that Michigan's congressional districts are not constitutionally apportioned on the basis of population and orders redistricting.

Mar. 28—Radcliffe College President Mary I. Bunting is appointed a member of the Atomic Energy Commission; President Johnson announces the appointments of 4 other women to high-ranking posts. At a news conference, Johnson also declares that he will make a personal inspection tour of impoverished areas.

President Johnson declares Alaska a major disaster area following the earthquake that struck yesterday.

Mar. 30—Formal debate on the civil rights bill of 1964 begins in the Senate.

Labor

Mar. 4—A Chattanooga, Tennessee, jury finds President James R. Hoffa of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters guilty on 2 counts of attempting to fix a federal jury during his 1962 trial in Nashville.

The 33-day old tugboat strike of Local 333 of the United Marine Division of the National Maritime Union is settled. In addition to increased welfare and pension benefits, the new agreement provides for wage raises over a 3-year period.

Mar. 12—Hoffa is sentenced to 8 years in jail and is fined \$10,000.

Mar. 16—In the continuing conflict over the change in the railroads' work rules to eliminate featherbedding, J. E. Wolfe, chairman of the National Railway Labor Conference, declares that if any of the 5 operating railway unions strikes against any line, the work rules changes will become effective "almost immediately."

Mar. 17—Railroad representatives and government officials confer on a settlement of the work rules controversy.

Mar. 18—United Automobile Workers President Walter P. Reuther states that his union will seek a 4.9 per cent increase in contract negotiations later this year.

Mar. 20—At the opening of the U.A.W.'s 19th constitutional convention, Reuther states that the most important issue during contract negotiations will be the improvement of working conditions in automobile factories.

Mar. 21—A strike called against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad is called off after a U.S. district judge orders an injunction against the unions.

Mar. 23—President Johnson addresses the U.A.W. convention; he warns against "a revival of the price-wage scale" and urges that "our prices and our costs not rise."

The Bituminous Coal Operators Association and the United Mine Workers Union sign a new contract providing for a one dollar per day wage increase in each of the next 2 years; the soft coal mine workers'

daily wage will increase from \$24.25 to \$26.25.

Politics

Mar. 10—The nation's first presidential primary of the 1964 election is held in New Hampshire.

Mar. 11—According to a complete but unofficial tally of the New Hampshire primary votes, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam, has received 33,459 votes as the Republican presidential nominee in a write-in campaign. Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater received 21,748 Republican votes; New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, 19,475 Republican votes; former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, 15,736 Republican votes (also in a write-in campaign).

In the Democratic primary, write-in votes for Attorney General Robert Kennedy for vice-president total more than 7,700.

Mar. 19—At a Democratic fund-raising dinner in Washington, Johnson promises that the people of the U.S. "can look forward to a better deal." He praises the 88th Congress.

Segregation and Civil Rights

Mar. 1—In New York some 1,800 persons march, in the first city-wide demonstration called by the Puerto Rican community to demand better education and integrated schools.

Mar. 4—U.S. District Judge Sidney Mize orders 3 local school boards in Mississippi to prepare school integration plans, beginning with at least one grade a year, becoming effective in September, 1964.

Mar. 6—Seven members of the East River (N.Y.) Congress of Racial Equality stage a sitdown on the Manhattan approach to the Triborough Bridge, obstructing rush hour traffic. They are removed by police. The demonstration protests poor conditions in East Harlem schools.

Mar. 10—In a march sponsored by 6 labor and civil rights groups, some 3,000 demonstrators parade in Albany, New York,

in support of civil rights and social reform. Mar. 12—A group of some 10,000–15,000 persons demonstrates in New York City to demand the preservation of neighborhood schools; the demonstrators oppose the Board of Education's plan to combine schools to provide further integration.

Mar. 14—The General Assembly of Maryland passes a bill outlawing discrimination in public accommodations.

Mar. 15—The Council of Federated Organizations (composed of the N.A.A.C.P., the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Congress of Racial Equality and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference) approves details of the Mississippi Freedom Summer Program. The program will include political and social education and will promote the registration of Negro voters in Mississippi.

Mar. 16—Some 268,000 students boycott the New York City public schools to demand that the Board of Education speed up its plans for integrated education. Absenteeism numbers 160,000 above normal. The boycott, sponsored by the Citywide Committee for Integrated Schools under the Reverend Milton A. Galamison, does not have the support of the N.A.A.C.P., the Urban League or the Congress of Racial Equality.

Mar. 19—In Birmingham, Alabama, Negro demonstrators renew protest marches (discontinued since September, 1963), blaming the city's failure to fulfill integration promises.

Mar. 22—Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, declares that Klansmen intend to establish and live in private communities to avoid federal integration orders; the communities will be set up under private corporations.

Mar. 23—Racial violence in Jacksonville, Florida, causes the deaths of one Negro woman and one white man; many persons are injured. Police arrest some 200 Negroes.

Mar. 24—Violence and rioting continue in Jacksonville.

Mar. 25—The new Jacksonville biracial community relations committee announces a

plan to end racial violence. Mar. 29—In Birmingham, Alabama, 35,000 whites and Negroes attend integrated Easter services conducted by the evangelist, Billy Graham, at a football stadium.

Mar. 31—Mrs. Malcolm Peabody, mother of the Governor of Massachusetts, and others, in a biracial group, are jailed in St. Augustine, Florida, after attempting to be seated in a segregated dining room.

Supreme Court

Mar. 2—The Supreme Court affirms a lower court ruling that congressional districts in Texas with disparate population figures are violating the constitution.

The Supreme Court refuses to review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit holding unconstitutional a section of the Hill-Burton Act of 1946 to give separate but equal assistance "where separate hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups." The Hill-Burton Act covers federal aid for hospital construction.

Mar. 9—The Supreme Court reverses by unanimous vote an Alabama libel judgment of \$500,000 against *The New York Times* and 4 Negro ministers. L. B. Sullivan, a Montgomery, Alabama, city commissioner, charged that he was defamed by a *New York Times* advertisement raising money for civil rights. In delivering the Court's opinion, Justice William Brennan Jr. states that a public official's conduct while performing his duties may be criticized despite "factual error" or "defamatory content" provided that the criticism is not deliberately malicious.

VATICAN, THE

Mar. 8—At a mass commemorating the 400th anniversary of the end of the Council of Trent, Pope Paul VI urges that Protestants and Catholics end their differences.

VENEZUELA

Mar. 11—Dr. Raul Leoni is inaugurated as President, succeeding Romulo Betancourt. The shift marks the first transfer of this

office from one democratically elected Venezuelan President to another.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Mar. 5—U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara declares that North Vietnamese aid to pro-Communist Viet Cong rebels has increased; as evidence he cites captured Viet Cong weapons.

Mar. 7—Premier Nguyen Khanh announces a one-year reform program to improve the standard of living, to increase government stability, and to strengthen the anti-Communist military effort.

Mar. 8—McNamara arrives in Vietnam on a fact-finding mission; he is accompanied by other top-ranking U.S. officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maxwell D. Taylor. On his arrival, McNamara tells Vietnamese crowds that the U.S. will aid Vietnam as long as necessary to defeat the Viet Cong.

Mar. 9—McNamara and Taylor accompany Khanh on a tour through the countryside.

Mar. 12—McNamara and his party depart. Before leaving, McNamara reiterates U.S. support for Khanh.

Mar. 13—It is reported that, in their talks, Khanh and McNamara have agreed to some military action against guerrillas in North Vietnam; however, McNamara has urged Khanh to place first emphasis on the war in the south.

Mar. 14—It is reported that yesterday the fact-finding mission told President Johnson that the war effort in South Vietnam has improved and that additional U.S. aid for the Khanh regime should be granted.

Mar. 15—It is reported that in 2 attacks yesterday and today, 4 U.S. airmen aboard a helicopter and 2 aboard a spotter plane were killed when their vehicles were shot down by Viet Cong guerrillas.

Mar. 17—The White House issues a statement after a meeting of the National Security Council endorsing Khanh's plan for pursuing the war. The statement voices U.S. optimism that the "situation can be significantly improved in the coming months,"

and reaffirms the U.S. commitment to extend aid to South Vietnam.

Mar. 18—Premier Khanh declares that he is prepared to restore diplomatic relations with Laos. He also names a mission to Cambodia to meet with Cambodian Prince Sihanouk to discuss border problems.

Mar. 20—Vietnamese forces accompanied by U.S. military advisers attack a Cambodian border village. The Cambodian government issues a formal declaration accusing the U.S. and South Vietnam of joint responsibility. (See also *Cambodia*.)

Mar. 22—The Military Revolutionary Council (South Vietnam's highest body) meets for the first time since Khanh seized power on January 30, 1964. By unanimous vote the Council re-elects Khanh chairman. Khanh announces a reorganization of the Council.

Mar. 30—As a first step in Khanh's "clear and hold" program, army officers begin an emergency training program to learn techniques for administration of areas from which Viet Cong rebels have been routed.

YEMEN

Mar. 3—Following 3 days of talks in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia issue a joint communiqué urging "independence" for Yemen. The 2 countries have supported opposite sides in the royalist-rebel power struggle. The rebels seized power in 1962.

Mar. 16—President Abdullah al-Salal arrives in Moscow for a visit.

Mar. 24—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) announces that a 5-year treaty of friendship has been signed by Yemen and the U.S.S.R. It is also reported that the Soviet Union has promised increased economic aid for Yemen.

Mar. 28—It is announced that British planes have destroyed a Yemeni fort in retaliation for a Yemeni attack on the Federation of South Arabia.

PRINTED BY BUSINESS
PRESS, INCORPORATED



CURRENT *History* • 1822 Ludlow Street, Philadelphia 3, Penna.

ISSUES BELOW ARE AVAILABLE FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE
INDICATE IN PROPER SPACE THE NUMBER OF EACH ISSUE WANTED

Current Issues

- North Africa (1/63)
- Latin America (2/63)
- India (3/63)
- West Germany (4/63)
- East Europe (5/63)
- Government and Medicine in the U.S. (8/63)
- China (9/63)
- Soviet Union (10/63)
- European Common Market (11/63)
- Western Africa (12/63)
- Latin America (1/64)
- South Asia (2/64)
- East Africa (3/64)
- Japan (4/64)
- Britain and the Western Alliance (5/64)

Coming Soon

- Disarmament in Perspective (6/64)
- Weapons Control Today (7/64)
- The United States and Weapons Control (8/64)

Still Available

- Africa: A New Nationalism (10/61)
- Africa South of Sahara (12/62)
- American Economy (7/60)
- American Foreign Policy and the Communist World (10/59)
- Asia and Southeast Asia (12/61)
- Asia, South and Southeast (11/62)
- China (9/62)
- Disarmament and Coexistence (5/62)
- Government and Education Abroad (6/61)
- Government and Education in the U.S. (7/61)
- Government and Labor in the U.S. (9/59)
- Middle East in Perspective (4/62)
- Problems of American Education (8/61)
- Progress in the Middle East (5/60)
- Public Power in the U.S. (5/58)
- Russia (10/62)
- Soviet Union: Programs and Policies (11/61)
- Tensions in East Central Europe (4/59)
- U.S. Military Policy and World Security (4/60)
- World Federalism and Free World Security (8/60)

INDIVIDUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 year, \$7.75; 2 years, \$14.50; 9 months, \$6.05.

NINE MONTH GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$6.05; 5 or more, \$5.15 per sub.; 10 or more, \$4.70 per sub.; 30 or more, \$4.25 per sub.; 50 or more, \$3.80 per sub.

TWELVE MONTH GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$7.75; 5 or more, \$6.85 per sub.; 10 or more, \$6.25 per sub.; 30 or more, \$5.75 per sub.; 50 or more, \$4.95 per sub.

RATES FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE: 1 copy of a single issue, 85¢ per copy; 5 or more copies of different issues, 65¢ per copy; 5 or more of the same issue, 55¢ per copy; 10 or more of the same issue, 50¢ per copy; 30 or more of the same issue, 45¢ per copy; 100 or more of the same issue, 35¢ per copy.

CURRENT HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia 3, Pa.

- Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.
- Please send me group subscriptions for 9 months; or 12 months.
- 1 year, \$7.75 plus 3 free issues as marked above. 2 years, \$14.50 plus 3 free issues as marked above.
- Check enclosed. Bill me.

MR. {
MISS
MRS.
ADDRESS

CITY ZONE STATE 5-64-3

These offers are good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

KEEP UP-TO-DATE

SOME OF THE THINGS CURRENT History OFFERS YOU

★ AREA STUDIES . . . Month after Month, our area studies will keep formed and round out your background information on vital topics.

CHINA (Sept., '63)	SOUTH ASIA (Feb., '64)
RUSSIA (Oct., '63)	EAST AFRICA (Mar., '64)
COMMON MARKET (Nov., '63)	JAPAN (Apr., '64)
WEST AFRICA (Dec., '63)	BRITAIN AND THE WESTERN
LATIN AMERICA (Jan., '64)	ALLIANCE (May, '64)

Subscribe now to CURRENT HISTORY. Exclusive and Original Studies will provide you with invaluable, factual material that you can rely on for accuracy.

Nowhere is such material duplicated. are similar studies available at such CURRENT HISTORY's continuing volumes are one-of-a-kind.

COORDINATED AREA STUDIES contain seven or eight articles each devoted to a pertinent topic in world affairs. Each of our cont is a specialist in his field, who brings you his first-hand knowledge, background, impressions. Each article in an issue focuses on a different aspect of the subject for complete coverage of the complex problems of today's world.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW . . . offers a day-by-day chronological account of the important events in all the countries of the world, both large and small. This is the only monthly chronology of its kind being published in the United States.

AREA MAPS help you follow the text.

DOCUMENTS . . . Our documents section reprints the texts of important treaties, laws, diplomatic notes, speeches, to provide original source material. See how this material increases your understanding of how history is made.

BOOK REVIEWS . . . Comments on current books of interest to our readers bring you concise notes evaluating the latest publications in the social science field.

A SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY BONUS

With your subscription you will receive three free issues. Today your need for background information on the problems of our century has increased one-hundredfold. Concerned citizens everywhere are awakening to the fact that they must be prepared to meet ever-growing demands upon their insight and understanding.

3 FREE ISSUES

Your subscription to CURRENT HISTORY will include three coordinated studies FREE — chosen from our list of Available Issues (see reverse side) — plus the next 12 issues for the usual yearly subscription price. Don't forget to select your three free gift copies from our list on the other side of this cover.

← PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE FOR FULL DETAILS